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ABSTRACT
This paper is a 100 page study of the American High
Command - the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, It analyzes the environment in which
the present defense organization functions, with special em-
phasis on the major dichotomies influencing our defense org-
anizations, policies, and behavior: wartime vs. peacetime;
civilian control vs. military control; centralization vs.
decentralization; unification vs. separation; hardware vs.
software; economy vs. strength; military comptrollership vs.
civilian comptrollership; et al. Interface problems are
highlighted. *fter a brief review of the historical devel-
opment of the present defense organization, an analysis is
made of the implications of employing either the Joint Staff
or General Staff concepts at the National Military Command
level. A concluding endorsement of the Joint Staff concept
and system follows, with recommendations for its improvement
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'As long as there is a boundary
between the political and military
authority, and this is an essent-
ial feature of a democracy, any
so-called perfect Whitehall mach-
ine is impossible."
—Air Vice Marshal E. J, Kingston-McCloughry
in Defense Policy and Strategy
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Never before in our history, with the exception of the war
years, has our National High Command had such an influence on the
lives of every American. Even the smallest town newspapers reflect
this concern daily throughout our great country. The stakes have
never been higher. The price of error has never been greater.
It is an unprecedented responsibility which our National High
Command has of insuring the domestic tranquility in these critical
times. It is little less of a responsibility which every American
has to understand the nature and responsibilities of the National
High Command and its relationship to the entire organization for
national security. Only with such an understanding will the




AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT ;
THE GREAT DICHOTOMIES
In Roman mythology we are told of the god of war
,
Mars, and how he was given two names - Quiri'nus for
when he was complacent; Grad'ivus for when he was war-
like. Thus, the Romans "built two temples, one within
the walls of the city for liars Quiri'nus that he might
keep the peace, and one without for Mars Grad'ivus,
that he might counsel them in war. How well the Rom-
ans understood the schizophrenia that is the lot of
men of war, even when deified; for, elementary as it
may appear, it is the states of war and peace which
have had the greatest continuous influence over the
character of military men and their social order. Be-
cause these states traditionally have been diametrically
opposed in nature, their appearance and disappearance
over the pages of history have often left behind a
trail of chaos, uncertainty, misunderstanding and vac-
illation with those in whom the defense of nations was
vested.
To be victorious in war, military machines must be
well tooled and lubricated. As the times advance, so
does the need for these machines to be so kept in time
of peace; yet the ever-increasing list of commentators
on national security still talk about the roles of the
1.

military in peace and war in widely differing vocabu-
laries, often realizing that something is wrong, but
not knowing exactly what. Even the casual reader of the
1958 Defense Reorganization Hearings cannot help but
re^d the frustration between the line.";
It is the intent of Congress „ o not to esta-
blish a single Qhief of Staff over the Armed Forces,
nor an Armed Forces General Staff ooo
Such an organization is clearly desirable in
battle, where time is everythingc At the top levels
of government, where planning precedes, or should
precede, action by a considerable period of time,
a deliberate decision is infinitely preferable to
a bad decSsion. Likewise, the weighing of legiti-
mately opposed alternative courses of action is one
of the main processes of free governments Thus a
general staff organization - which is unswervingly
oriented to quick decision and obliteration of al-
ternative courses - is a fundamentally fallible,
and thus dangerous, instrument for determination of
national policy,, *
Although he did not develop the idea of dichotomy
as such, Stanley spoke in surprise of the same problem
in another time:
The Joint Board (Army and Navy) „<>• was not a-
dapted to the demands of wartime s Indeed, it was
suspended by President Wilson during the American
neutrality in World War I on the surprising ground
that it might encourage preparation for war before
the United States was involved! 2
The literature of national security affairs and
'-House of Representatives Report No»1765; Depart-
ment of Defense Reorgani zation Act of 1958, USGPO, Wash.
DTcT, l958,p 27o
^Stanley, Timothy 1ft., America n Defense and Nat ional
Security; Public Affairs Press, Wash. D.C. ? 1956, pc67
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history itself is replete with instances of split roles
and organizations o It makes the conscientious or even
curious ask the question: What is the proper role of
the military high command In peace or war? What is their
relationship to the civilian high command 9 If not every
American, at least every officer mus t answer these ques-
tions for himselfo He cannot make sense of his place
in our society unless he does And society cannot
make sense of him Q
Certainly no rational person in a democratic so-
ciety would suggest that military commanders or organi-
zations should enjoy the same freedom of action or de-
gree of activity in time of peace as they must in time of
war. but it is also true that we must review our' poli-
cy of the dual standards of organization for defense -
in war and peace. Can we afford to reorganize for war
after we have lost the peace?
If there is a single thread running through the
history of American defense 9 it is two-stranded i war
and peace„ ar with its stresses on weapons 9 hardware^
the big noise s strong and decisive military leadership
with authority^ peace with its drives for defense econo-
my, and control over military activities and power - on
the one hand concentration of military power, on the
3o

other, dispersion of that power
o
The environment of high command is full of dicho-
tomies. But the one between war and peace is the great-
est force of all.
The advent of the atomic bomb and the requirement
for presidential authority to release any such weapon,
has been the greatest influencing factor to come from
war since the bomb was first dropped. It placed the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, directly into what
years ago would have been regarded as tactical situa-
tions, but which today, whether regarded so or not, are
strategic. This event has been and still is reshaping
our defense organization. Responsibility begets control,
and this has very real consequences at the organization
level of the Pentagon. Walls and other partitions come
down, others go up, phone numbers change, people retire,
people are retired.
The greatest modern force molding our1 defense or-
ganization, to come from a period of peace, has been the
popular acceptance of economists and the tools of their
profession. (The professional military officer finds
it difficult to resist comparing the economists to the
nuclear bomb, and the general conflagration, smoke in
high places, and blast effect which attend both.) Hitch
5 Hi t.ch, C.J. and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of




tells us that we can no longer mobilize our economy
after the outbreak of hostilities - only before. And
since he claims the most efficient stategy is also the
most economical, he says that it is consistent that
both our stategy and economy should be optimized before
hostilities.
For a society, as for an individual, the metamor-
phosis between wartime and peacetime living is a very
traumatic thing. It shakes the very soul of national
existence - from the basic nat icnal oojectives to the
time people get up in the morning; from the government
spending policy to the price of shoes, or the ability
to buy shoes; from the words of great men to the lives
of high school kids; from the fundamental mix in the
national economic pie to what' 11 you have in your cof-
fee, sir? Now changing drinking habits is not the sim-
plest matter in the world; yet, somehow, we seem to think
that shifting from a wartime to a peacetime military
organization - from the professional, military wartime
frame of mind and value set, to a new frame of mind,
a new set of values - we seem to think that these things
are simpler! We become so immersed in the business of
getting on with the peace that the first and natural
thing to undo is the enormous military complex. It
5.

must change dramatically in size, composition, mission,
and modus operandi . To a great extent, of course, this
is true. But in our haste we do not contemplate the en-
during nature of certain military functions. It is not
until sometime later, when sparks of fear begin to fly,
and remembrances of days past begin to be recalled, that
the national psyche is ready to review. By now it is a
different animal altogether which is under review and
all the more confusing for it.
In other days, a p t other wars, this was not such a
calamitous policy to pursue. Time permitted reshaping.
No longer. mhat was once called 'the mobilization per-
iod' is no longer always a relevant, meaningful, or even
real thing. The fact that mobilization was possible in
Berlin, Cuba, and Vietnam does not mean that it will al-
ways be that way. It could, and would, in any all-out
nuclear exchange, be replaced by an execution period.
In other words, the period which we depended upon tradi-
tionally to prepare to do things will be replaced by a per-
iod during which we do things. This hypothesis says
that we must now be prepared to do, rather than simply
to get prepared. It means that that someone to a cer-
tain extent must have a rational wartime frame of mind
which is not inconsistent with the peacetime world in
6.

which he lives. This may seem impossible by definition.
But that particular someone (quite plural in fact), not
being a robot, must be able to make sense of himself in
the world in which he exists. The hypothesis says fur-
ther that there must be an organization in v.-hich that
someone is relevant; an organization which reflects the
dichotomy of military preparedness in peacetime; an or-
ganization which - God forgive the world in which we
live - exists in spite of the 'peace 1 !
Professor Morris Janowitz, the sociologist from
Michigan, raised this whole problem in his explanation
of the constabulary force concept:
The use of force in international relations
has been so altered that it seems appropriate to
speak of constabulary forces, rather than of mili-
tary forces. . .
.
The military establishment becomes a consta-
bulary when it is continuously prepared to act,
committed to the minimum use of force, and seeks
viable international relations, rather than vic-
tory....
The constabulary force concept encompasses the
entire range of military power and organization....
weapons of mass destruction. .. .military aid pro-
grams.... and counter-guerilla warfare....
No longer is it feasible for the officer corps,
if it is to be organized effectively for strategic
deterrence and for limited war, to cperatt on a
double standard of "peacetime" and "wartime" pre-
mises. Since the constabulary force concept eli-
minates the distinction between the peacetime and
wartime establishment, it draws on th*5 police
concept.
^
4Janowitz, Morris; The Professional Soldier , A So-




The military officer is aware of the need to eli-
minate reaction time. He thinks about it in terms of
airborne alert forces, submerged or 'hardened' missile
striking power, dispersed land forces, continuity of
command, emergency evacuation plans, controllable bore
or selective war plans, pre-taped messages and advanced
command and control systems, including large automatic in-
formation systems. He does not always think about it in
terms of the changing image in the mirror, and what it
means; much less does his suburban neighbor, very likely
a veteran of World "War II, perceive the new-school chi-
sel -w*>rk of Mars Modernus.
In retrospect, it would take some dozen organiza-
tion charts to show graphically the growth and organi-
zational trends in the military establishment since the
late eighteenth century. It would take nearly as many
charts to show the changes made in the chain of command
during the same period: they do not necessarily corres-
pond to the changes made in the organizations for defense.
(It is interesting to note that while the chain of com-
mand has such a great influence on the whole defense or-
ganization, and while it is in many ways the heart of the
matter, the author was unable to find any extensive
8.

treatment of the suoject per se
, ) Rather than include
a compendium of organizational charts, only two are
shown. The others are easily obtained in annual editions
of the U.S . Crov er nme n t Organizational Manual and various
professional magazines and journals, and the primary
purpose here is not an historical account.
A brief inspection of Figure 1, the defense organi-
zation resulting from the National security ict of 1947,
and Figure 2, the present organization, shows the drama-
tic changes which have been made in the past 15 years,
hat it does net show is that most cf the changes have
been made in the past 5 years. Prior to I960 there
were no defense agencies, or 'super-agencies 1 as they
are often termed, with the exception of the highly spe-
cialized Defense Atomic Support agency (DASA) and Nation-
al Security Agency (NSA).
Today there are super-agencies with broad functions
and powers in the areas of supply, communications, and
intelligence (DSArDCA :DIA ) . The creation of these agen-
cies took many of the vitals out of the service organi-
zations, in terms of functions, expert personnel, space
and influence. Figures 3 and 4 show what has happened
to the chain of command since 1927. It has practically
9.
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UNIFICATION OF THE MILITARY SERVICES *
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been reversed, placing the advisory (dotted line) Joint
Chiefs into the chain of command and removing the ser-
vices from operational control of forces «, This was
primarily a result of the 1958 Reorganization Act,
What remains? Personnel support, doctrine, certain com-
munications, 'retail' supply and R&D, It should be no
wonder that the military chief of staff feels frustra-
tion over his role He says that they told him in 1958
that his role as service chief was support, with which
they removed all but a handful of his forces from his
operational controlo So he supported. In 1960 he was
told that long haul communications had to be coordinated
to ensure rapid communications between the President and
the unified and specific commands (and below). The fol-
lowing year he was told that intelligence reports were
not consistent from service to service And then there
was something about belt buckles
„
Each time the problem was solved by unification
under the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) or the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) C There are degrees of unification,
and one need not talk about a single service to talk
aoout unif ication* The defense agencies are a case in
hand. The service reactions varied from the Navy, at
14,

one end of the spectrum, hauling up all the canvas it
could take trying to keep the weather gage; to the air
Force on the other, taking off without a turn-up, to
gain early control of the scene of action. hile one
was bitterly fighting to retain the status quo, the
other was busily offering spaces, experienced directors,
and ready made data bases as starters* The Army, ei-
ther through a policy that it had nothing to lose
through unification, or through no policy at all, did
not take a strong stand. The Marine Corps, as usual,
stayed away from the whole mess and somehow avoided any
serious effects.
The proponents of unification said it was long
overdue. The days of strictly uni-service operations
were over. And joint operations meant joint planning,
joint following, and to a large extent joint supoort.
They said they were tired of service provincialism
("All'. FCRCn bYhb ONLY" or "NAVY KYkb ONLY"), politics,
duplication of effort, parallel reporting and obsoles-
cence. They said that the JCS system worked during
World tf/ar II and was working now. They said that young-
er officers of the three services, as well as some flag
officers, got along perfectly well and were highly res-
pected by one another. What was wrong with the others?
What were they afraid of?
15.

The others did not think it was that simple. They
said the idea of unifying this or that function was not
what bothered them so much as it was their concern over
where it would end. They thought they knew. They feared
that one service would eventually gain control and stran-
gle the life-breath out of the others; that instead of
being three 'provincial' services, unification would
lead us to be all provincial in the same way! That the
variances of opinion were signs of life and health -
that no stcne would remain unturned.
They said that they were sick of politics too, but
that you had to fight fire with firy. They cited exam-
ples of so-called joint groups, away from the tri-ser-
vice scrutiny of the Washington area, which, after in-
sulating the minority representatives, were worse than
uni-service in provincialism. ..hen the services were
separata, people were more aware of differences and the
need for coordination. When they were together, it was
assumed there were no unsolved differences. Coordina-
tion was taken for granted. Yet one service dominated
to untold extents. If what they had seen was a sample,
they wanted no part of unification.
It was more than self -perpetuation, they said. We
16.

had a responsibility to make matters in which we were
experienced a consideration in our national strategy.
If we didn't listen to ..hat thf ! others knew best and if
they didn't listen to us, we would be again committed
to the single channel strategy, such as we were in the
days of massive retaliation - a strategy which they said
cost more in ground lost and dollars spent than ever be-
fore in our history, While the money went into green-
houses and two mile runways, the action went on over the
beaches of Lebanon, the swamps of Vietnam, and in the
Formosa btrait. It was, they said, a strategy based on
a model world, not the real world. They spoke of rats
and elephant guns. But in the end it was not so much
the strategy itself as it was its negation of all other
possible strategies. And this was what cculd happen
when one service predominated. You asked what we were
afraid of , they said: that's what we're afraid of.
We're scared to hell, if you want to know.
isut their arguments were not altogether upheld, or
at least their point of view was not. The proponents
of unification said that the single point of view had
not been avoided through the separate service system.
Tn fact, the massive retaliation strategy had predomin-
ated in a period of considerable service interdependence.
17.

..ith more unification, such an event would oe nearly
impossible, because plans would be made by Individuals
of the three services simultaneously. The ' status-
quoticians ' said their point had been proved by acknow-
ledgement of such a naive as c umption. iait and see,
they said. Vait and see.
Unification and centralization are not synonymous,
but they live and grow in the same climate. \nd. while
centralization in the Department of Defense is usually
attributed only to the efforts of Secretary Mc^amara,
other forces converged to add their influence. Centra-
lization of information was an outgrowth of our- sheer in-
ability to manage information by manual methods, and the
growing need for Presidential control over nuclear forces.
Where information is centralized, so will oe decisions
and oower. The use of advanced computer information
systems in the services shook the hornets nest of com-
patioility, but only lightly at first. The Congression-
al restraints on thn number of officers permitted in the
Joint Staff ( J-btaff \ when related to the functions of
the staff, fostered - indeed legislated - within the
Staff an inability to cope with the information it
needed and got from the unified and specified command^.
18.

Under such conditions a DIA was inevitable, if only
from the point of view of repudiating the inability of
J-2 to manage joint intelligence information. To a
large extent the same was true of DASA's Damage Assess-
ment Center(DODDAC ) with regard to J-3 j DSA and J-4;
DGA and J-6. It was the only way short of legislation,
and Congress was already concerned over the size of the
J-Staff. The unmanagebillty of operational information
in the Joint War Room(JWR) and Joint War Room Annex
(JWRA) was demonstrated even when challenged by some of
the most outstanding personnel the services could order
to fill the JWR/JWRA positions.
The Joint Staff finally acknowledged that it would
have to establish its own information system. Though
in its infancy, the Navy had already begun on a large
scale basis in the Navy Information Center (NAVic), and
the \ir Force had begun on an intermediate scale in the
<\ir Force Command Post. The \rrny was already laying
false floors and building fire proof tape vaults.
The idea of a National Military Command System
(NMCS) with a National Military Command Center (*TMCC),
an enlarged and automated JWR/JWRA et al, receiving in-
put from the service information systems as well as o-
th°r agencies in the Vashington area, began to take
shape. The World-Wide Military Command and Control
System emoodied the NMCS and the unified and specified
19.

commands. The compatibility problem took on new dimen-
sions and vastly more depth. The whole theory of stan-
dards came into play, from character standards at one
end of the spectrum on through word, message structure,
and semantic to behavioral standards at the other end.
These trespassed not only into data standards, but pro-
gramming standards, programming language standards, data
base, file generation and maintenance, display, hardware
standards, etc. when such matters of compatibility be-
come paramount they are inevitably handled through uni-
fication of resources and centralization of authority.
It was bound to happen; and together, because neither
unification nor centralization alone cculd overcome the
incompatibility of the service systems. Not only are the
service systems incompatible with one another, but each,
to varying degrees, is incompatible with ^he MMCC. The
DCA only now, through the National Military Command Sys-
tem Support Center (previously DODDaC), has the necessary
authority and talent to undertake to solve the problem,
lore authority and talent will be needed before anvone
is on top of the problem. These are but examples. There
are many others - targetting, military assistance, mili-
tary legislation, military liaison with other govern-
ment agencies, to mention but a few. These are some of
the forces which, with or without SKCOEP's guiding hand,
have helped to shape the path toward unification and
20.

centralization. A good case may be made for the argu-
ment that futher delay in unifying effort and central-
izing authority would have caused the services to be-
come so entangled in incompatible systems that the only
way out might well have been the single service itself.
Ther^ is little doubt that, without the influence of
SECDEF, the services would not on their own have gen-
erated the degree of unification needed to overcome the
effects of modern warfare and technology „ They were
each already too committed to their own standards to
give in to the others.
Perhaps better than anyone else, the .Secretary of
Defense understood the power that would be invested in
a centralized and unified command system, and the need
for close civilian control over the new capability, from
its inception. Futhermore, he understood the opposite
hypothesis also - that the system was needed to effec-
tively control cur vast operating forces. In the 1963
appropriation hearings, secretary McNamara said:
achievement of our overall national security
objectives requires that our stragetic retaliatory
forces be kept continually under the control of the
constituted authorities, from the President on
down to the commanders of these forces => before,
during, and after a nuclear attack. Funds are in-
cluded in this budget to further improve and streng-
then this command and control system,,
5Department of Defense Appro pria tion s for 1963 , Hear
ings oefcre a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropri-
ations (HR), Part 2, oecretary of Defense, et al, Over-
all Financial Statements, USOPO, r.'ash. , D.C., 1962, p. 19
21.

Phe changing ...-.-- of war , - a< - - b . caused
nor e and a c r : 1 : Lcul ty ir li etweer t 3-
tlcal and strategic operations. . : many
'tactical' operatior have taken or sti I jic propor-
tions. 3ortie oi - : not
have grc - I : ;ts . rod : raft a
so-called 're 1 1 t ;t _ opei : ar € ;on-
iir ly to s K>li1 Llitary pro-
-_- i' tn« Jarri e . tti : v t c - raised! to
a very high level, !ear* - -. . .- of :entral-
Lzation of decision- matter 1nvolv 1 :• e s
Foday, it is i ire ert : thi Sj oeni - a real-
ity about t ada p1
Ehis dc not thai e mus t s _ - '1,1s
of reaction. Dn tl jonti - il eai that we raus t
e nor pur poseful iecisive i cur development thar
: before . e sar rac Long r af ford tc s 1 ac and
itch our sel 1 Dl ed tt . - L1 t< reflect
: : 111. . r. " 3 iltei tive of accep-
ting this i mat : ! r e 1 _ :" ovidinj
1
- Leader f r 3efer - o r a n&zatl il and o per
-
at iot _ level ot t . or : f not accept i ng i t . md ser i -
: sly risking Loi : . I Leadership ir th€ nation-
al gourmand structui [h€ Latter :c.;^ T - might " ::.,:!-
1=.
-I/ te :•"--:: ' ostrj '« I :~ we are scneemed about the
pot nti y ianger c jensequene* . r -'-: eeritrall-
22,

The changing faces of war and peace have caused
more and more difficulty in distinguishing between tac-
tical and strategic operations. This is because so many
'tactical' operations have taken on strategic propor-
tions. A. sortie of aircraft twenty years ago did not
have gross strategic effects. Todays, one aircraft may.
••ihen so-called 'routine tactical ooerat ions' are con-
ducted in Berlin as a reply to a politico-military pro-
blem in the Carribean, the decisions munt be raised to
a very high level. years ago, a high degree of central-
ization cf decision-making was a matter involving choices.
Today, it is a property of the new environment - a real-
ity about which we must adapt.
This does not mean that we must simply be animals
of reaction. On the contrary - it means that we must
be more purposeful and decisive in cur development than
ever before. e can no longer afford to stand back and
watch ourselves evolve and expect the results to reflect
our will. The services have the alternative of accep-
ting this as a matter of real life and oroviding respon-
sible leadership in our defense organizational and oper-
ational developments, or of not accepting it, and seri-
ously risking Iosp of military leadership in the nation-
al command structure. The latter course might be chari-
tably termed ' ostrichism' „ If we are concerned about the
potentially dangerous consequences cf increased centrali-
22,

z ation of authority in OSD, as we should oe in our roles
as citizens of a free and non-belligerant nation, then
our efforts should be directed toward providing for ade-
quate checks and balances. At least our efforts should
not be toward the recovery of sunk costs, 'j'hey should
not be toward attempting to make decisions which, for
better or worse, the complicated state of world affairs
in great part has long since made for us.
We have considered some of the more formal or 'sta-
tutory' aspects of the defense organization, which pro-
vide much of the official environment in which our de-
fense leaders operate. This is but one aspect and not
always the most important.
Superimposed over the formal organization and sel-
dom shown on the organization charts is the semi-formal
or board organization. This is the proclem-oriented
organization of Task Forces and cattle Teams which are
created to solve special problems or follow certain
crises. They are formed from the fabric of the services,
the J-Staff, and OSD depending upon the nature of the
problem or crisis. They are usually temporary, though
some have been determined to be of more lasting value
and chartered as a board, in which case they find their
way into organizational charts. Normally, however, they
are created where problems requiring unusual coordina-
tion and liaison arise, and are disestablished upon
23.

transmittal of a final report.
The informal organization does not exist in chart
form, nor could it ever except in the past tense. The
closest one could come to a graphic display of this or-
ganization would be through a compilation of every Bates
List Finder (flip-top telephone directory) in the Penta-
gon. This would not be the same thing as inspecting a
DoD telephone directory.
The inform il organization is that organization which
accomplishes the tasks and carries out the policies and
directives which are iterated through th° formal organ-
ization, out it is not simply a responsive organization.
It is also an organization through which new ideas ire
generated, many of which are formalized, approved, and
regenerated through the formal organization as new or
changed policies or directives. This organization is
made possible by personal contact - by telephones, con-
ference rooms, cafeterias, the executive dining room,
the Secretarial and Chief of Staff messes, the hot dog
stand in the center of the Pentagon inner court (commonly
known as Ground Zero), the Toastmaster ! s breakfast club
(first names only), the concourse, the Pentagon corri-
dors, the athletic Club under the ramp leading to the
highth Corridor Entrance, various watches, the Fort
Meyer Officer's Club, and a delicatessen on Columbia
Pike, not to mention various service academy, squadron,
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command and ship reunions, neighborhood, office, society
and official parties. It is a very complex organization,
changing every time someone is ordered in or out - chan-
ging daily. There is very little relevance to rank in
the informal org mization, and many military officers do
not wear uniforms.
The forces at work are too numerous to list in more
than a partial manner. Internally there are pressures,
more often helpful than deleterious, caused by differ-
ences in the individual backgrounds of officers (line,
staff, specialist, subspec ialist and generalist, Army,
Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force - even some Coast Guard
and Foreign Service), officer turnover, civilian-mili-
tary relationships, deadlines, general orientation to-
ward crisis operations, power struggles, directives, po-
licies and excitement, as well as a pervading sense of
bigness - of involvement in a very large enterprise
with high standards and an inexhaustible supply of cri-
tics. There are semi-external forces as well, emanating
from inter-service relationships; competition for funds,
people and influence; evaluation of intelligence reports
and perceived threats; and individuals - Robert S.
KcNamara, Charles Hitch and Dr. Harold Brown, for ex-
ample. There are exterior forces which deeply effect
defense behavior. To mention but a few: Congress, GAO,
State, CIA, BoB, White House, NSC, industry, public o-
pinion, the press, the Constitution, and an impressive
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list of international economic and collective security
organizations and agreements. World affairs and the
economy are perpetually at work. The operating forces
have an immeasurable influence, perhaps more than any
other single group outside of the Administration. Tech-
nology and transportation, which have advanced the state
of the military arts and sciences in quantum leaps, are
tremendous forces, both internally and externally. \nd
even though the military is closely identified and often
responsible for such advances, the very size of the or-
ganization and th^ speed of advance make it extremely
difficult for the organization to adapt. In this en-
vironment, the semiformal and particularly the informal
organizations, as might be expected, are normally the
most responsive. Still, the crises nature of the Pen-
tagon makes it difficult for any effort toward long
range planning to gain the attention it warrants. This
is ironical in an organization which is so involved in
national defense planning.
To further complicate matters, it should be pointed
out that the reference to the Pentagon as a single en-
tity is a false uplift and mainly a matter of conven-
ience, actually, numerous activities of the defense
organization spread all over the Washington area, the
continental U.S., and throughout the world shape th^
true environment of defense.
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All of these things, and the image which the pub-
lic has - indeed which the officer has - of both the
'short-time' and the professional military officer, go
into the making of the environment in which people try
to make sense out of defense. The critics who charge
that our confusing state of affairs cannot simply be
shrugged off as a sign of the times 6 must use caution,
"hile it is true that we cannot afford realistically to
shrug off the effects of modern times, and while there
is very much indeed whijh we can and must do to control
our own destinies, it is equally true that there is no-
thing especially simple about modern times. There is
certainly nothing simple about the effects which the
current environment has on our defense organization and
behavior.
\ny discussion of defense environment, or any other
complicated social structure for that matter, is at best
a two dimentbnal fabrication of bits and pieces. It is
little more accurate than any of the traditional stereo-
types - the drinking Irishman or stingy Scotsman. \nd
,
although language is the bisis of thinking and activity,
ironically when one tries to exolain the complex environ-
ment, language does not suffice. At least our notion
6 Webster, CDR Harvey 0.,USN, "The Message Crap",
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , Vol. 89, Mo. 5, whole
wo.573, May 1963, p. 33.
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of language, our vocabulary, doesn't suffice; and like
the aviator, sooner or later we get to the point at which
we must use our hands to express ourselves any further.
That is the point at which the author is now. But it is
not as simple a matter as an Immelmann or eight-point
roll, and the language of gestures is less useful than
the written word, even though the environment is a spa-
cial as well as intellectual state. The analogy of the
aviator is not altogether lost, however, because it is
the dynamic nature of aerobatics which drives him away
from the language of words, and it is the dynamic na-
ture of cur' environment which makes word descriptions in-
adequate. The environment of the defense organism is not
described by the charts shown here. It is better de-
scribed by everything else in between and since . ^hese
represent only individual frames in a motion picture.
But it is the moving thing that is the real thing, not
the snapshots.
Prob bly one of the most enduring of all of the
dichotomies or problems in the defense organization is
that of the relationship or interface between civilian
and military officials. (Is this the personification
of the war-peace conflict''') It may in fact be a pre-
conception to even describe the situation as a 'pro-
blem', rather than as a form of check and balance. So
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often we regard 'conflict' as a problem that it is some-
times difficult for us to understand 'beneficent con-
flict', which, as in the human body metabolism, may act
as a homeostatic control system - a steam valve - for
our governmental body.
Whether it is a problem or a system, it is a fact
of life in politico-military co-existence. .bile in the
vast majority of cases high level civilian and military
officials have great respect and admiration for one an-
other, there are occasions when it is not so. Unfor-
tunately, when there is disagreement it is usually over
an important matter, and gains quick attention in the
press. By the time it has become a matter of public
domain, the basic disagreement may have lost all rele-
vancy, -hat. originally may have be~-n a military or
economic problem, or both, is now, in the hands of the
press and exploiters, a political issue. If the mili-
tary officials continue to treat the problem as a mili-
tary problem they will fail, unlesf they have a sympa-
thetic pre ss
.
In such a conflict the basic misunderstanding is
clouded by pride, position, determination to be upheld,
etc. The professional military officer feels that the
decision is one to be made on the basis of 'military
requirements', rather than political expediency, and
military requirements are his specialty. The civilian
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official strikes back, feeling that it is a matter of
'civilian control' and policy, that it reaches far be-
yond military proportions into economics, politics, in-
ternational relations, fiscal policy, law, or 'accepted
practices of sound management', about all of which he
knows something. The professional officer - after a
long life of devotion to duty, public service and the
familiar hardships of military life, with doubtful re-
turn on the hours spent in terms of thanks or his bank
account - turns the tables. For yearn he has resented
b ing regarded- as a transient wherever he has gone. This
was a function of geography. Now the question is of
military significance, and in this matter it is the ci-
vilian who is the transient. He reckons that the civi-
lian is essentially a product of the spoils system.
His position is a receipt for services rendered long
before he was ever appointed. His military experience
may be worse than none at all. It may have been as a
draftee of 18 months or 2 years - just long enough to
learn to dislike everything about the military service,
especially its officers. Or he may have served during
the war years when things were different: the public
was behind the military, there was no shortage of men,
money, or materials. To need was to have in most cases.
There was a real cause - a real issue. So this, the
officer reckons, is how the civilian sees the military
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of today, even though to him it is very different indeed.
He knows his service is undermanned, under-capitalized,
obsolescent and in many other ways needing. From what
intelligence reports he sees, he believes there is a
cause, an issue. He feels the civilian regards him as
a yes-man - a doer, not a thinker - who speaks in mono-
syllabic terms about monosyllabic ideas when the sub-
ject is changed from strategy or tactics to nearly any-
thing else. This the military man sees at a time when
it is be coming more and more difficult for him to com-
municate with his subordinates, with their n^w vocabu-
laries, nearly all of whom have college degrees and many
of whom have advanced degrees in scientific and commer-
cial fields, or what traditionally were considered fields
of only scientific or commercial interest. In short,
the military man views the officer corps as a highly
select group of people who know about something other
than Clausewitz, the Mahans and Douhet. He wonders if
the civilian sees things quite the same way. And, at
this point of the dispute, after editors and self-styled
'insiders' have made their speculations, the civilian
rarely does view the officer this way.
The civilian now views the officer as a single-
channelled radio which plays the same tune over and over
again. He sees him in need of the kind of outside in-
fluence which only a non-military background can offer.

He sees him as one who feels that he alone has had to
suffer inconvenience. The civilian, aft^r frequently
taking his appointment against his will, and then often
only by persuasion of the President, has also suffered
inconvenience. He has often taken his position at great
financial loss, both in salary and in his greatly changed
ability to invest. He may have to liquidate investments
at a time which he knows is to his disadvantage. But
he iriu?t if he is to avoir irresponsible charges of 'con-
flict of interests'. He knows that sooner or later he
is going to be asked to open his financial portfolio for
public viewing. He may have- had to tear up stakes to
come to Washington, a city he never particularly cared
for anyway, knowing full well that no matter what he did
he would, be criticized by someone - if not the American
Legion then maybe the Americans for Democratic Action.
He works as late and a? hard as the best of the military.
He sees the need to out the military in its place from
time to time, and this may be a good time. He sees the
military as a split house, often fighting from service
to service. If the services cannot themselves agree,
what is so sanctified about the 'holy military opinion'.
He sees the military as bphind the times. /hile he knows
that great scientific advances are made in the military
man? times before they are made in the commercial world,
he feels that most of this is the work of civilian

scientists either working fcr or under contract to the
_: ernment. Ee regards the management practices in the
Lilt z. iFcbaie. He feels that the military cffic c
holds things back from him, things which he must know
.: .:. .: I : manage the military organization, and it is
his responsibility to do just that. He wants the expert
Litai idvice :ut feels that he does not have the ccn-
. these who can give it. He frequently is forced
to get advice through circuitous routes, through his top
iiilian staff members to the mere junior military men,
:;• :: : : .itary officers on his own staff.
.
- :::"icer says that the decision is his to make
dec - he has the expertness of military knowledge to
mak LI , le eivllia says: knowledge or no knowledge,
- has the ultimate responsibility and is therefore en-
titled to make the decision. it is more, he is in fact
making the decision even if he permits the military man
to do it fcr him.
_•
, this time the speculations in the newspaper are
getting closer. boon, perhaps, the tension will get to
-..-. breaking point and the officer will be dismissed.
Cr he will resign. Regardless of the action involved,
it is rarely a question of whom to 'retire', civilian
cr milit . It is a question of military or not. No
nuch esteem the President may hold the
officer, the civilian appointed to direct that officer

scientists either working for or under contract to the
government. He regards the management practices in the
military a^ archaic. He feels that the military officer
holds things back from him, things which he must know
if he is to manage the military organization, and it is
his responsibility to do just that. He wants the expert
military advice but feels that he does not have the con-
fidence of those who can give it. He frequently is forced
to get advice through circuitous routes, through his top
civilian staff members to the more junior military men,
or from military officers on his own staff.
The officer says that the decision is his to make
because he has the expertness of military knowledge to
make it. The civilian says: knowledge or no knowledge,
he har the ultimate responsibility and is therefore en-
titled to make the decision. What is more, he is in fact
making the decision even if he permits the military man
to do it for him.
oy this time the speculations in the newspaper are
getting closer. boon, perhaps, the tension will get to
the breaking point and the officer will be dismissed.
Or he will resign. Regardless of the action involved,
it is rarely a question of whom to 'retire', civilian
or military. It is a question of military or not. No
matter in how much esteem the President may hold the
officer, the civilian appointed to direct that officer
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must be upheld. In exceptional cases this is not neces-
sarily true.
If the officer resigns or is dismissed, the corps
begins to worry as a group that the civilians want to
make puppets out of the military in general. The best
officers will not under such conditions remain in the
service. That price they will not pay. And unless the
civilian takes positive steps of greater proportions
than a press leak, the dissatisfaction will grow, re-
sistance will increase, objectivity will wane, and the
time between feuds lessen.
This is indeed the extreme. The question is, can
completely
it be avoided. The answer must be that it can be/avcided
only by dictum. At that it can never be removed alto-
gether as a definite subterranean force, even though it
may be eliminated as a force on the surface. In other
words, the alternative is a fiction. The reason it is
a fiction is because, beyond the fundamental principle
of ultimate civilian control in any matter, or the bi-
linear system, there cannot in real life be any clear
distinction between what Is the proper and lawful role
of a civilian official and what is the rightful realm
of a military official. Broad guidelines can be esta-
blished, and have been. In most instances they work,
out not always. We can say, for example, that problems
of especially military significance should be solved by
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military officials, and problems of essentially manage-
ment, economic or political natures are properly in the
sphere of civilian decision,, But the words "especially"
and "essentially" or other such qualitative descriptors
are always open to interpretation,, They will vary with
th G intricacy of the problem in question, the time at
which it is raised and, most important, the personali-
ties of the principals involved.,
i former Secretary of one of the military depart-
ments, who shall remain unnamed, was asked by the author:
Can there be any clear lines established which will en-
sure smooth working relationships between civilian and
military officials? His answer was that there could
not - particularly at a time when military problems have
taken on greater and greater significance in what used
to be regarded as non-military areas He further indi-
cated that this was a good thingo When military men
stand up to be counted, whatever the cost, and civili-
ans do the same, we are more likely, more often, to come
to the best decisions. The price we must pay from time
to t ime when matters reach a boiling point is high in-
deed. But the prices of more extreme systems, which
may not ostensibly reach the boiling point as often,
would be considerably higher in terms of the best de-
cisions being made in the national interest.
The. Hoover Commission subcommittee report on special
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personnel problems recommended a policy for placing mill'
tary and civilian officials (Recommendation No. 2b):
The criteria on which such a policy can be established
are :
Military Personnel Assignments
a. U.1 combat-related support activities and posi-
tions and organization immediately supoorting oper-
ational forces exposed to potential enemy action.
b. Positions in supplier-related activites neces-
sary for the training of officers for combat-rela-
ted support.
c. To provide the user experience to supplier-re-
lated support.
Civilian Personnel Assignments
a. 'vhere management and technical skills usual to
the civilian economy are required and can be exer-
cised without the necessity of military status.
b. here continuity of management and experience
can oe better provided by civilians.
c. At fixed support activities throughout the
world. 7
The next recommendation was that such criteria as listed
above shculd be expedited to eliminate practices of du-
plicate staffing.
Upon initial review these recommendations may seem
to make sense, but a deeper look raises some imponder-
ables. There are extremely few organizations or posi-
tions in the military establishment which do not need
some kind of user experience. The user regards this
of prime importance and demands control in order to
ensure military responsiveness. By this logic, which
7Subcommittee Report on Special Personnel Problems
in the Department"" of Defense , with ltr of transmittal
signed by Herbert Hoover; June, 1955, p.57.
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Is strong logic, nearly all assignments would call for
military personnel. On the other hand there is hardly
a position of importance which does not suffer from the
discontinuity of military turnover. i.ven the most hard
and fast militarist would agree to this. Yet by this
criterion nearly all assignments, and surely all impor-
tant ones, would be made with civilian personnel. The
two are not only incompatible with one another, but to-
gether are incompatible with the recommendation against
double staffing. ith the exception of very few and very
ccvious cases, such as surplus disposal or demolition
Of enemy installations, practically any position could
fit ooth civilian and military criteria - surely most
positions in the Pentagon and related headquarters ac-
tivities and offices.
It is clear that we are no longer talking about the
same civilian whom we were talking about earlier - the
high level, policy-making, political appointee or bche-
dule G servant. Now we are talking about the profession-
al civil servant. He is no transient. And while in many
ways he 'competes' with his military colleagues for in-
fluence, positions of power and recognition, he is much
closer to the problems of the mil'tary, because he has
been so involved in the administration of the military
departments, and in working side-by-side with numerous
military officers. He feels often that he Is more know-
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ledgeable of departmental affairs and practices than are
the host of military officers who come and go every two
or three years and do not have to remain to live with
the castles they build in their short moment on the beach.
Often he feels that the military officer has nc experience
in management. He feels as though he has to rock with
the seas, now working for one officer now with another,
i^ach may have very different ideas about how things
should be run. One may completely undo everything his
predecessor has done, only to have his sucesscr rein-
state the original. He finds little solace in the idea
that if his boss does not like his ideas, all he need
do is bide his time and soon he will have a new one who
may be more sympathetic. He feels that the important
jobs all go tc the military and there are hardly any
'choice jobs' to which he can look forward unless he
moves to a non-military department, into agencies with
which he is unfamiliar and in which other civilians have
long-standing seniority.
The military officer often loses patience with the
professional civil servant. He sees him as a bureaucrat
dedicated to self-preservation and, except for expansion,
tc the status quo. Vegetation. He sees the civil ser-
vant drop his pencil at 4:30 p.m. in the middle of a
sentence and rush for the parking lot, while he, the of-
ficer works late. He sees the civil servant as one who
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does not have the education he has h^d and not nearly
the degree of management expertise he would have expected
Of our professional administrators. He can remember
having his first command when he was 25 years old, per-
haps of a small ship, company
,
or a large aircraft with
a crew of a dozen personnel. Not long after he was 40
years eld he had a larger command - perhaps of several
hundred persons. In between were a number of staff jobs
In all, he fe^ls he has as much or more management ex-
perience as the civilian hat is more, he knows that
seen he will be going back to the operating forces and
will have to live under the policies, plans, and direc-
tives which are presently being produced, while the ci-
vilian will remain apart from the implementation of his
own designs. He is determined that those policies, plans,
and directives will be, albeit imperfect, workable at the
operating level. He insists upon military control of
such matters, though he supports the precept of ulti-
mate civilian control. He se-s it as just that - ulti-
mate. He does not see it as a condition at the inter-
mediate or lower levels.
' ith all cf this the two know that they cannot do
without one ancther. The military officer sees in the
civil servant the needed stability and continuity cf ad-
ministration. The civil servant sees in the officer the
operational knowledge he brings with him £gain, in the

great majority cf instances, they get along well and have
established, though often tacit, working relationship?.
It is only when either is challenged publicly that con-
flict is certain. It is during these periods that their
relation? are mopt publicized and not during the more
frequent and longer lasting periods cf mutual support.
Today there is a third dimension of civilian-mili-
tary relations, unlike either of the two already dis-
cussed. It is the interface between the civilian scien-
tist and the military officer. The soaring growth of
modern science and technology has caused a great need and
influx of scientists into the military departments. There
are, for example, nearly two PhD's in the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations for every admiral. 8 Many of
these scientists work directly under military officers,
frequently at higher salaries and with greater social
prestige in the community.
Here, the feelings of officers vary greatly, often
inversly in scientific rapport with the age and rank of
the officer. The younger officer, perhaps with an advanced
degree in some scientific discipline, is frequently in
sympathy with the scientist. He feels as though he may
have a better understanding of the interdependency of
technology and warfare than some of his superiors. He
8 See Office of the Chief of Naval Operations tele-
phone directory, OPNAV 09B8 -PI, Jan. 1962.
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frequently goes to the scientist unofficially for advice
concerning the applications of technology to military
problems. If he has not learned a scientific specialty
of his own, he has usually been introduced to the vari-
ous disciplines enough to know that technology is an un-
mistakable ingredient in modern warfare. The more senior
officer is usually in one of three groups. He may him-
self be highly scientifically trained, as one of the very
few of his generation of officers, and have a keen under-
standing of the relationship between warfare and science.
If so, he has the highest regard for his scientific col-
leagues, and their arguments are of the variety to be ex-
pected among mature, thinking, persons. He may not be
so trained, in which case he usually stands among the
loudest of pen-rattlers. He strikes out against the soft
intellectual defense in favor of the old fashioned 'fast-
est-with-the-mostest ' hardware approach, often overlook-
ing the fact that the hardware he holds up in evidence
against the. scientific approach is the creation of the
scientist he is indicting. He sees the scientist as an
e~^,-head, living in an ivory tower if not a fools world.
He cuestions the involvement in military affairs of such
men who have never so much as had an eye blackened in
anger
.
In between is the vast population of the uncertain.
They have too oft c n seen the impossible materialize to
41.

question too strongly the words of the scientist. At
the same time they speculate on where it is all leading
and how much control anyone - scientist, officer, or
civilian - has over where it will all take us.
The scientist, reading these widely varying reac-
tions, sees in the military officer all men. He, there-
fore, is less likely than anyone to classify military
officers as a group. He treats each as an individual
and nehaves accordingly. but there are still predomin-
ant problems which he views as paramount to sucessful
scientific operations in the military amphitheatre. He
feels that while in many ways he is better able tc carry
out his scientific work in a government laboratory, he
is sure that there is still too much control of scienti-
fic endeavors by lesser qualified officers. A'hile he
respects the need for user involvement, he deplores user
control during the basic research and development phases.
When the scientist moves out of the laboratory into
the Pentagon he se*=s tremendous red tape, misunderstand-
ing of the role of the scientist in the military estab-
lishment, and a great deal of provincialism and power
struggling, none of which he regards as optimal. He
often feels that the military and professional civil
servant make things unduly complicated, even what few-
simple things remain in this world. He sees them trapped
in the irrelevancies of tradition, protocol, politics
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and directives. He sees crisis orientation in an organi-
zation which should be mainly concerned with long range
planning. He sees a handful of senior officers ir. whom
he h.AS great respect, and with whom he can communicate. But
not nearly enough of them. He sees a greater number of
junior officers who hold great promise, but who are too
junior to make any real difference in times which wait
for no one. He too wonders what will come of it all and
if he wouldn't be better off back at Bell Labs, or MIT,
or wherever it was.
Still another plane of intersection is that between
the military and the civilian contractor. Many elements
combine to make their relationship probably the most
satisfying of them all. To begin with, the two are net
in competition with one another. Their co-existence is
one of mutual consent. They seek each other out for mu-
tual benefit; the officer for improved military systems;
the civilian for a contract and a part in the national
defense effort. They seek out each other's advice and
work closely together. T> either one of them knows any
quitting time when they are on top of a problem. They
usually speak the same language and complement each c-
ther's weaknesses and strong points. They often drink
together. Many time^ the civilian has had recent ex-
perience in the military, usually as an officer. Some
are graduates of service academies The officer knows
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that he can usually depend upon the civilian to produce
.
He likes the business arrangement and the knowledge that
he can tell the contractor what he wants and get it. If
he doesn't get what he wants, he knows that there will
probably be a very good reason, rather than the shoulder-
shrugging salute and excuses of government agencies.
''.hen there is conflict between the officer and civi-
lian contractor it is seldom allowed to get out of hand,
usually due to the diplomacy and political acumen of the
contractor. Their misgivings about one another, if they
have them, are rarely exchanged. But often the civilian
sees only a few officers for whom he has great respect in
a whole organization* Others he sees making plays for
power or sheepishly agreeing with superiors on policies
which he regards as stupid, inefficient, contradictory,
and potentially if not actually very costly c And he knows
something about relative costs - that's how he makes his
living. He regards many of his officer colleagues as
politically naive and technically mediocre. He feels
that, if he ever had to, he could buffalo most of them.
He regards it a matter of practise to let the officer do
most of the talking until he knows him better. He sees
in the military many cliques and he must know who stands
where and in whom he can confide. He sees officers as a
group of people who are either extremely underpaid or ex-
tremely overpaid, and rarely paid what they are worth.
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He must win the confidence of those who will decide on
his proposal, but he is naturally attracted to the few
officers he considers highly underpaid,, He hopes they
are one and the same. If they gain mutual confidence,
and they usually do, the civilian will give his own o-
pinion as such in addition to his company's opinion in
matters where they may not be the same. The officer will
speak for his superiors but will speak for himself as
well. Many more tax dollars have been saved through this
mechanism than will ever be known. Many are the ideas
which have Qeen injected through this relationship for
systems improvements which were not always in the ori-
ginal bargain, nor provided for, nor always allowed, by
regulations, contract law, and policy,
\t the same time the officer has his misgivings too
tie sometimes sees the contractor as too ccmpetive - too
willing to unjustly attack his competitors. Very often
the officer has worked with those competitors and is- more
knowledgeable of their output and ability than is the
critic. The officer sometimes sees the contractor as
hungry - or intellectually dishonest - willing to do what
he is told if it means more profit, even though it may
not be the best thing to do from a technical point of
view. He sometimes sees the contractor as patronizing
and overconfident. He regards them as brilliant but in
many cases naive. In their effort to gain contract
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approval some contractors go too far in stating their
real or imagined ability to solve military problems.
The officer is sometimes suspicious of such stated abil-
ity when he may know that the problem is long standing
and very much more complex than the civilian makes it
out to be In special instances he may even see the con-
tractor as a competitor, particularly if the contractor
can out-perform the officer on his own grounds, whatever
they may be This is not rare, and if the contractor
does not subdue his role - even give undue credit to the
officer involved - a very hard thing for a competing or-
ganization to do - he may alienate the officer and lose
a valuable customer More than one corporation has suf-
fered from excellence
From this discussion the reader might guess that
our defense organization is composed of high school child-
ren with grammar school intellects But we rarely hear
about the normal course of business „ We seldom hear about
how things get done Yet they do more ttan they do not.
And while each of th<= conflicts discussed here has been
played out or are being played out today y each is a gross
generalization,, There are nuances in between which are
not even all known to the author and which certainly
could not be listedo There are civil servants who do
no. drop their pencils at 4:30 o There are officers who
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drop theirs at 4:00. There are contractors who are not
diplomatic at all. There are contractors vvhc are not
greedy, because they do not have to be, or because they
have principles. There are good scientists who leave
the government for more money, and there are highly com-
petent contractors who take jobs as civil servants for
considerably less money. There are officers who are not
highly technically trained who have an uncanny under-
standing of the techno-militarj interface. There also
are scientists who are politically motivated.
More than anything else said here, there are argu-
ments which are real arguments and honest disagreements
which are not wholly of selfish origin. There are peo-
ple - most of them - whose motivations are irreproachable.
The greatest portion of the time the greatest number of
people work together and do what needs to be done. The
notion that because an enterprise is the biggest in the
world, employs the greatest number of people, has many
times the budget of the next largest, and is by far one
of the most important enterprises in the world - the no-
tion that because of these things we should, at far be-
low standard salaries, have nothing but the absolutely
best talent possible throughout, is sheer nonsense. No
matter how one cuts the parts up, there are still only
lO-o of the people who are better than 90% of the people.
^nd they are not all in the military nor in the civil
service. Nor are they always appointed to executive
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positions. Nor are they all in industry. Talent is a
very scarce national resource. \11 is not well, but
all is not as chaotic as some would have us believe.
as long as we recognize the need for military ex-
perience and civilian control at the higher levels; and
military experience and continuity throughout; and we
recognize these things simultaneously; then we must commit
ourselves to a policy of civilian-military co-existence,
and tc a great deal of dual staffing. This may not be
the cheapest way to run a railroad, but it is the only
assurance we have of keeping the trains on schedule.
The price of running a defense organization is ex-
tremely high anywhere. You cannot capitalize destroyers,
tanks, or jet bombers. There is no profit motivation, but
there is a great fear of losing which makes us want tc
play it safe - to hedge our bets with a little extra.
And the price of military-civilian co-existence is high
in terms other than simply dollars. High level disagree-
ments, publicly acknowledged and followed like the Fri-
day night fights, take a great toll in terms of confidence
and morale in th^ officer corps and throughout the de-
fense organization. The consequences are felt through-
out industry and the nation-body as a whole. No one
would trade this price in for freedom of the press, but
neither can we afford to overlook these costs altogether.
What are the alternatives? One is an all civilian
Defense Department. Civilian officials would be the first
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to squelch any such plan as completely irresponsive to
military considerat ions. Another would be a Defense
Department with civilian officials in all important po-
sitions throughout, each with a military advisor. This
wruld cost a price in terms of military effectiveness
which would be extremely difficult to recover, hven the
man on the street would rather have the best defense and
pay more, than have the most efficient government with
a second best defense. The margin of error is very fine
and it is better to be slightly over the green side than
slightly over the red.
It is of course possible to have an organization,
as in part we do now, in which the offices of the Secre-
taries are predominantly civilian with military advisors
• and the military departments are mainly military with
civilian assistants for the sake of continuity; and at
the same time follow a policy of no public disagreement.
In this case the high level officer disagreeing with' the
civilian official would not be permitted to speak out.
The price here would be very high indeed, and soon there
would be extremely few if any outstanding individuals
who would be attracted to a military career.
We could assign military officers to our Secretarial
would be
positions. This /so out of character for cur society
that, even if it could work, it would never gain accep-
tance, least of all in the officer corps, ;vhich is all
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too aware of the hazardous potentiality of politically
motivated military bodies such as it has seen and known
in other countries.
The price of the system of 'conflict' is high, out
it is not as high as it seems, relative to the alternative
systems. Futhermore, we understand it. It is as much
a part of American Government as is the Presidential Veto,
the Congressional investigation, and the Supreme Court.
And it serves an equally important role.
This is not to say that improvements and reforms
cannot be made and should not be made. tVe must provide
the organization necessary to permit military respon-
siveness, both military and civilian management training,
a better mutual understanding, and ultimate civilian con-
trol. This we can do through an organization pattern si-
milar to that shown in figure 5.
The system of 'conflict' is not peculiar to the
American form of government. Is not a house specialty
of the Pentagon. It is, in fact, the mainstay of any
unwarlike government. Air Vice Marshal Kingston-
!.
rcCloughry stated it thusly:
\s long as there is a boundary between the po-
litical and military authority, and this is an es-
sential feature of a democracy, any so-called per-
fect Whitehall machine is impossible. 9
9 Kingston-f.lcCloughry, Air Vice Marshal E.J,,
Defense . Policy and btra tegy , Frederick \. Praeger, Pub-
lishers, N.Y.
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This is more than the old-standing bilinear system.
It is a means whereby individual and organizational growth
can oe effectively planned. The civilian assistants and
aides on the military side of the house today would be
the source of civilian executive power on the right side
of the house tomorrow. The military assistants and aides
on the right side today would be the prospective mili-
liach major official would have his own 'interpreter',
tary executives of tomrr.orrow. / jiach would have been intro-
duced to the others problems and outlook. Hach would know
at least some of his opposite numbers on a personal basis,
a point frequently disregarded. And there would be no
douDt about who was in charge of either side of the or-
ganization. There would be no competion, for example,
for control of the management and administrative ser-
vices organization in the military organization. It
would be clearly a military job with a civilian assistant
and junior civilian aide. Similarly, there would be no
argument over whether the comptroller positicn on the
right side should be filled by a civilian or military
officer. It would be clearly a civilian position with a
military assistant, and oerhaps a junior officer aide.
If there was to be any argument it would be of the or-
der, "on which side of the house should the comptroller
appear?" If this could not be mutually agreed by both
sides, as in most cases it probably could, the issue
would then be presented to the Secretary by members of
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the Advisory Group for a final determination. Such an
organization would work not only within the individual
military departments, but in the office of the Secretary
of Defense as well. It wculd provide long term growth
patterns for civilian and officer alike. The civilian
could see the potential of a career in defense, one which
need not end in a capacity subservient to a military of-
ficer. It would provide an attraction fcr talent, be con-
ducive to a better mutual understanding, and most impor-
tant of all would ensure maximum military responsiveness
within the framework of ultimate civilian control. It
would permit regular turnover of military officers to
keep the organization operationally oriented while pro-
viding continuity through civilians. It would be in com-
plete contradiction of the quoted recommendations of the
Hoover Commission
There is no perfect Pertagon machine which Is net
from time to time in need of oiling. But the squeaks
must be he^rd. ' nd all the preventative maintenance in
the world will not completely eliminate the chance of a
system breakdown. If we knew how to tool parts that well,
we'd be well beyond the stage of needing such a machine.
Clearly we're not.
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_£2 NATIONAL JCnk^ND :
bU,lF HI bTChIC ih NOTBS
Prior to 1798 naval affairs (there wer^ no ships)
were handled with \rmy affairs, as were for 1 hat matter
Interior affairs, under a single department of the gov-
ernment, the ' ir Department. It was largely due to
President 'dams' dissatisfaction with the handling of naval
matters 'hat a separate Department of th^ Navy was es-
tablished in that year. Until 1S9S, with the acquisition
of overseas territories, there was little attention gi-
ven to reconsiderations o u lification of the \rmy and
Navy. according tc Stanley, the Joint Board was created
in 1903. On vprii 2?, 1927, the secretaries of ar and
the Navy jointly promulgated the pamphlet, Joint \ction




their previous "Joint irmy and Navy \ction in Coast De-
fens^". These were the forerunners of today's JCb Pub o 2
Unified \ction rmed Forces (UN i \F) The 1927 publica-
tion states:
The authority for the Joint board is published
in ar Department 0.0. No 8 94, 1919, as amended by
G.O.No. 29, 192,', and Navy Department 0.0. No. 491,
1919, as amended by 0.0. No 152, 1927 The board
consists. .. .of the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Chief
of btaff, and the assistant Chief of Staff, Var
Plans Division, General Staffs and „ . the Chief of
: ival Operations, and the Director, i,Var Plans Divi-
sion, Office cf > raval ( perations, „ . « .with a secretary
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detailed from the personnel of either*, » . Department!
But there was still no statutory description of the
Board :
The existing joint agencies for coordination
between the \rmy and the Navy have no legislative
nor executive basis for existence, These agencies
exist as a result of agreement between the Secre-
taries of the #ar and wavy Departments c The re-
commendations of these joint agencies are advisory
only, become effective upon approval by both Secre-
taries, and in some cases upon further aporcval by
the President. 1
In June, 1922, the Army and Navy Munitions Beard
was established, consisting of the "\ssistant Secretary
of Mar and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, assisted
by ten committees, together with many subcommittees com-
posed of officers on duty with the tVar and Navy Depart-
ments"1 ^ The board coordinated planning for acquisition
of supplies and munitions "for war purposes or to meet
the needs of any joint plan JO O also . „ evolving a suitable
legislative program which will enable the procurement
program to be out into effecto
In 1927 the Aeronautical board was established
"to prevent duplication of effort and to secure „ „ coor-
dination in the development and employment of the 'Tiny
Mr- Corps and Naval f\viation (The author wonders if
any of the original members of this board lived to wit-
ness the recent TPX controversy )
Joint \ction of the Army and the Navy, Prepared by
the Joint Board, USGPC? .ash OS( D,C, S 1927" Chapter XI, p l„
11 12





Provisions were included in the 1927 document for
appoint] of "unity of command" commanders by the Pre-
sident for joint c 1 ions X le Jci. : ird became in-
active in orld II, apparently due tc its peacetime
orientation, and ..." succeeded by the establishment of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), in action resulting from the
Ircadia Co nc hich fill t - discussed later. The JCS S
with co-equal i rship, consisted of the vrmy and Navy
oervice Chiefs and t " '' ral of the Army ,ir
Force, juently, f rs, the Comman-
f • ;
o (The vrmy \ir Fore .ctually
ere il
' i942c lJ ot only as a result of a long
struggle for more independ* f iir forces md the shock
of enterin ir , but also to align our JCo along the
lines c h ." I I fs of Staff C Lttee) Th 5
ret ." 3 force support and r . 1 control of th^ir
l s c t
'
T ' of the first thr
Dnths of t] h t]
'
s of ider in Chief,
leet ( ? h ] 1 \ afferent of-
ficers,
udmi'j Is nd bt Th S ~e
_
.1 to
'unction the i cc ody ! of American milit 13
lead.
'
~ the perie:-1 192 I) /.' 1 ".
_. y proponents of
more aut : 5 for ... ;islation was oroposed
>y the lieu; 1 c F every ongress from the 37th
to the 8Cth, f
c
.
' Lion of th 1 single
15 t ... . j

department In fact, in 1921 such legis] tion (H.I-c. 12456;
72nd Congress), defeated en the House Floor 152 tc 175
- a mere 18 votes ^°
?c'_cing blow in favor of such ] lation was
struck by President ' in cv. D < mber 19, 1945, when in
a message to Congress he said:
Jri sident as Commander in Chief, should net
personally have to coordinate the 4rmy, ^-xvj, and
the _ir r'crce ith all the other problems before him,
the President cannot be expected tc I , the se-
veral branches of the national defense should be
able tp_rely for that o: "" ition* , ,at the Cabinet
levele 17
In a year and a half it was law - not exactly as
Truman hac ted it, but it was only a r of time
In addition tc creat: the National Security Coun-
cil, presumably gi1 th milit iry services a greater
part to play in deteri in'
__
.tional policy; the central
Intelligence \gency (CI\) to coordinate the intelligence
efforts of the military services and other government agen-
cies; anc! the vational Security Resources ^oare1 ; the Na-
tional Security \ct of 1947 was the first significant mea-
sure of service unification since the establishment of the
Department of th T w, separate department in 1798 Q
It also established the Department of the \ir L'orce as a
separate executive department
Uni f icciti on of the ..'ar and Na_vy_ Departments and
Postwar Or gaTTza t i o n~Tcr_
T
^ tional j^ecuri^j a" he por t~To
Hon D James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, by Ferdinand
Eberstadt,et al; Senate Committee on Naval Affairs Print,
U.S.G.P.O., Ccto 22, 1945, p o 243
17Quoted *n Stanley, Co- Cit„, p 76
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The \ct established the three military services as
part cf a National Military Establishment, for which a
Secretary of Defense was provided The three services
remained executive departments and their Secretaries con-
tinued to enjoy Caoinet status This provision was to be
the subject of later controversies, when,; after appoint-
ment of James V. Forrestal as the first be ere tar y of De-
fense, considerable confusion arose as to his status with
regard to the Service Secretaries „ Ke wan forced to oper-
linly in a coordinative capacity and primarily by per-
suasion.
In the years to come, the authority of the Secretary
of Defense (Si.CDKF) was to become a fundamental issue. In
nearly all instances of subsequent defense legislation, the
President was to request more centralization cf power in
the office cr the Secretary cf Defense, and less for the
Service Secretaries. That tec was enly a matter cf time.
Something else happened in 1947, almost without no-
tice, out not without significance. Cn January 1, the
Manhattan Project was established as the Armed Forces Spe-
cial ,'eapons Commando It was the forerunner of the uni-
fied Defense Agencies, and is today known as the Defense
At on !.c ip DOrt >:er cy (DASA ) .
Today it is an organization of cv^r 7000 people,
and while it, is net immedial ely under Si,CDEF, as is the




Like its latter-day sister agencies , the Defense Commun-
ication (DC A) and Intelligence (DIA) igencies
?
it is im-
mediately responsible to the JCSo But r: S.A relations with
the J-btaff have be*n very clo^e,, though sometimes strained
This ha--' had a considerable influence on the authority,
size and effectiveness of the JCb and J-btaff. For DASA
also works closely with the .tomic energy Commission ( AEC )
.
This has, for example, given the JCh' the direct ear of the
AJiC where pressure cculd b^ brought to bear in favor of
military recommendation with regard to nuclear weapons,
bince DASA has supporting functions to the JCb and the J-
btaff j it has also increased the effective size of the
Joint btaff ccnsiderably , although this is not usually
considered o It is difficult tc judge what might have
happened if DASA had been in CbD prooer, but it is safe
to say that its placement under the JCb greatly streng-
thened the JCb and J-btaff position^
The JCb met in Key -'.'est in March 1948, to determine
service rcles and discuss such sensitive matters as naval
aviation Broad missions and roles (air 9 land, sea opera-
tions,, 00 ) were forthcoming, but little agreement could be
reached on other imoortant matters
,
e g o the strategic value
1 8
of th- flush-deck carrier
)
The Key West agreement had
very little effect on the. statu? quo. If anything, it may
18
Hammond, Paul Y e , Organizing for Defense , Prince-
ton Univ 3 Press, °rinceton~ N.J.. 1961, p 8 334
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have had negative results when Generals Spaatz and Nor s tad
Indicated their agreement was only In the interpretation
of the Act of 1947 with which they di^a£r_eed_ in principle
:
it was apparent that the ' agreement " was worthless „ Inter
-
service "bickering" was evident, and this added fuel to
the fire cf these who sought greater control and centrali-
zation from above <> It was not long in coming,, The agree-
ment did not specifically give the general direction cf
all combat operations to the JCo (The 1953 revisions to
the agreement added as a function of the JCS; "including
guidance for the ooerational control cf forces and for the
conduct of combat ooerat ions
"
19 ) Primary functions cf the
services were further listed and clarified later in 1948
at the Newport Conference,,
The 1949 Amendments to the Act of 1947,. based largely
on Hoover Commission recommendat ions s changed the name of
the National Military Establishment to the department of
Defense (DoDK This was mor<= than an attempt at allitera-
tion,, They stated once and for all that legislation per-
taining to powers of heads cf executive agencies did in-
deed apply to SiiCDEF, greatly strengthening his position
and status o His powers were considerably strengthened,,
A Deputy Secretary's position was created and the three
Special Assistants were re-designated Assistant Secreta-
ries cf Defense (ASD), one of whom was to be the Comptroller
1 Stanley 5 CjDo Cit. ,p» 180,
bOc

of the Defense Department Although it was provided that
the military departments would be separately administered
by the Service Secretaries, they were placed distinctly
under the direction, authority , and control (commonly called
MDAC" powers) of the Seer eatry of Defense The service
secretaries lost their position as Cabinet member
s
The
SECDKF's power to transfer, reassign,, abolish and consoli-
date functions of the services ( "TB a " sowers) were clari-
fied. He was not to have TRAC powers in matters concerning
combatant functions Use of these powers elsewhere was
prohibited without first reporting to the Committees on
\rmed Services of the Congress was enjoined
against irer Lng the services or establishing a single
chief of staff or armed forces general staffo
The 1949 Amendments created the non-voting position
of chairman of the JCS who would not exercise military
commando .gain Congress expressed its traditional view
that there must be a safety valve for disagreement among
military departments, providing for a free statement of
miniority opinion and a healthy degree of competition..
The right and responsibility of military men to speak
frankly to Congress was reaffirmed., borne of those who
remember suggest that certain believers in the tradition
of separate military services did so on the hypotheses
that the only certain way of avoiding dangerous centrali-
zation of military power, was to keep them at each other's
throats o md when, in the mind of the public or Congress
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they were at one another's throat, the cry for more power
for the Secretary of Defense sounded more reasonable 50
it was in thf amendments, along with the call? for civi-
lian control, that considerably more power was given to
the Secretary of Defense, making him, for example, the sole
defense representative in the National Security Counc'l
(NSC) and in the Cabinet. By the same legislation the ar
Council wa? changed to the \rmed Forces Policy Council,
and the Joint Staff was increased from. 100 to 21C officers.
Title IV of the Act, "Promotion of Economy and Effi-
ciency Through establishment of Uniform budgetary and
fiscal Procedures and Organizations," added a Comptroller
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to
each of the military departments, and generally provided
the first steps in a revolutionary chain of financial man-
agement events which wa t: to culminate in 1961 with the in-
stitution of the Program Change Control System throughout
DoDo
On --pril 30, 195?, Reorganization Plan No. 6 was
passed by Congress It- abolished the Munition Board, h&D
board, and the Defense Supply Management Agency, trans-
ferring the functions to SECDEP.
Six additional \SD T s and a General Counsel were
authorized, greatly increasing the staff of OSD and the
Secretary's span of control. It provided the secretary
with a "counter-force" of civilian experts within his own
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staft'o They had solely staff functions by law
The Defense heorg .niza t ion \ct of 1958, above all
other things, removed all doubts a° to the authority of
the buGDi^o It is douotful if anyone in cur government,
with the exception of the President and the captain of a
ship, has ev^r been given more freedom of aetion Sub-
ject in certain cases to Congressional veto* 11 gave SJbCDjiF
power to transfer, abolish or consolidate non-combatant
functions o The set established the Director and Office of
Defense Research and engineering ( ODD&H. ) , removed opera-
tional control of nearly all operating forces from the
military departments and placed this control in the hands
of the commanders of the unified and specified commands
The chain of command was now from the President to th<^
Secretary of Defense to the unified and specified commands,
through the JCS.
The
-set provided means whereby the AbD's may in cer-
tain cases issue directives to the military departments;,
while reducing the number of Service Assistant Secretaries
from four to three In short, it further Increased con-
trol of the military deoar tments and forces at the SLGDj
and OSD levels. It might more accurately be described
this way: before 1958, we thought of S/.CDlt as 'The T^ext
Level' s Now it was clear that there was to be a new level
in between - OSD - for all practical purposes,,
The years 1961-1962 saw the results of powers given
to the SECDiiF in the 1958 legislation There was created
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an ASD 'Civil Defense) and two ASD's were merged into one
for Manpower, two others into Installations and Logistics
The Deputy Director ODR&& was elevated to the position of
an ASD, placing the Director above all ASD ! s The Office
of Programming was established under the ibD( Comptroller
)
and the Program Package System, now known a? the Program
Change Control System, of budget formulation and review
was initiated o The Office of Organizational and Manage <=
ment Planning Studies was created under the General Coun-
sel and the functions of the Policy Planning Staff under
.bD (international security Affairs) was expanded a
The Defense bupply Agency was established, the only
super -agency not organizationally under the JCb With
this, greater emphasis was placed on standard procedures,
e„Fo 3 MILSTRIP, MILSTAMP, etc Q DIA was established under
the JCS, stripping the service intelligence efforts in
many important areas, not the least of which was the budge-
tary area For the service intelligence agencies it wa?
the beginning of the end. In fact, it was later than that., v
The functions of the Under Secretaries and the As-
sistant Secretaries of the military departments for finan<=
clal management, R&D, and installations and logistics were
standardized. * ninth command, U.S. Strike Command, was
established as a unified command, combining the *rmy's




T2his assertion aces not apply to all' aspects of intellig-
ence 9 some of which were already unified and certain of whidri
remain Intacte, 'i'hey cannot be discussed here

DCA received greater responsibilities The plan=
ning for the National Military Command Center was removed
from the J-Staff by Secretary McNamara and assigned to
DCA - to report to CDK&i- on a "copy to' basis with the
J-btaffc CDR&E played strongly in this develoomento
And for those who didn't already know 9 ODR&h was in the
game for keeps „ They saw to it that they had the talent
to stay in.
\s significant as all of these things were, it is
difficult to find a more important event than the assign=
merit of operational control of the Cuban Quarantine forces
to CNO, albeit in his capacity as Navy Member of the Joint
Chiefs of btaffo (That is a subtle but definite and impor-
tant distinct ion D ) It showed thp JCS system was e t ill
pliable. It was not so involved in bCP that soecial hand-
ling could not be cuickly and efficiently arranged o This
is strong evidence against the claim that the Jub and <]<=




THk j:rnURI!vG DhBATfe JCIKT VS. GKFU^L ST^^V
For years many military officers arid critics have
claimed that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff system
should oe replaced by a General Staf
f
The claims are
that the dissention in the JCS system would oe eliminated,
or- considerably lessened °, that our staff reaction time
would be quickened; that the Armed Forces would speak with
one voice Cur army and air Force, it is reasoned, have
traditionally been established as General staff So fi/hy,
then should not the direction of cur A r'med Forces together
be accomplished through a General staff of the armed For-
ces with a Supreme Commander?
The proponents of th- General Staff system have come
primarily from the ranks of the army and Air Force, while
prooonents of the Joints Chiefs system have been mostly
admirals. Congressmen and other civilians,, The difference
oetween the two systems is often not acknowledged and fre-
quently misunder stoodo
20
reishline, in outlining the his troy of the General
Staff system tells us how it came into existence in the
seventeenth century, referring then simply to the general
fficers of the army Q The General staff system was de-:
°^ieshline, John Robert, PhoDo, Colonel, General
Staff Corps, USA, Military Managemerit for National Defense.
Prentice-Rail, Inc» s bnglewood, N J 8j 1961, p 17
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velcped by Frederick the Great of Prussia and Pierre de
Source t of France following the Seven Years 6 War (1756-
1765) - Frederick in his history of the war, and Sourcet
in his Principles de la Guerr e de Montagne
s
It was not,
however., until after the defeat of the Prussian Army at
Jena in 1806 that Gerhard Johann bcharnhorst began the re
formation of the Prussian Army with the assistance of a
Captain vcn Clausewit.Zo One of the policies prescribed
by bcharnhorst was that staff officers should rotate back
to the troops from time tc time;, in order to keep planning
on a realistic basis and to avoid a clique of staff offi-
cers* This is the basis of the preset} UoSo Navy's
strictly-adhered^to sea~duty/shore -duty rotation system.
It is a policy which is considered of £ great deal less
importance in the \rmy and ,ir Force It is a policy
which is contradictory to the specialist concept, but
complementary tc the subspeciaiist concepto
Clausewitz was the first to define "general staff':
Scharnhcrst ° s protege, General von Clasewitz
( 1780-1831 ), did much to implement the Scharnhorst
principles and also preserved them for posterity
through his military masterpiece, On jVar Q Clause-
witz conceived that "the General StafFTs intended
to convert the ideas of the commanding general into
orders, not only conveying the former to the troops,
but also working out all matters of detail, thus
relieving the general from a great amount of trou-
ble c " This embodies the principle that the General
Staff is the commander's alter ego oo it remained
for Count von Moltke, as the Prussian Chief of the
General staff In the Franco-Prussian ; ar , to give
practical application to the principles of bcharn-
horst and von ClausewitZo Thus the General Staff
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concept as it exists in modern military organiza-
tion came into permanent being, ' 1
In 1902, Secretary of :.ar Elihu Root made a monu-
mental bid for an i.rmy General Stai In The >_nnual Re-
port of t^h^ Secretary of ^ar for the Year 1902 he wrote;
The most important thing to be done now for the
regular urny is the creation of a general staff 000 o
Our military system is till exceedingly de =
fective at the top 9000
It is easy for I President, or a seneral act-
ing under his direction, to order that 50,000 or
100,000 men pa )ture Havanao
make an order which my reasonable chance of b
ing executed he must do a il more than that
He must determine how many men shall be sent and
how they shall oe divided amor different arms
of the service oohe must get all the information
possi L about : 5lace to be cap-
tured and the strength ind character => oOf the forces
to be meto He n hat points his
troops shall land in C various harbors,
the depths of their i 1 icilities for
ndingooothe intervening ntry 00 othe climate oo
the t-rnper and sympathies of the inhabitants
'ormat It is the business of the
1 1 s t u f f to or o c u r resent,. It is pr ob
Pie that there would be r of alternative
plans. o .and the
J
d out each by It-
self with the reason for and against it, and prg_-
se nted to the Presideni : hls_ determi
ation Q ,Tthen m .the or3 be o~as~ec! upon
a "knowledge of the men and materia. 1 lilable for
its execution.
It was the lack of such _* body of men doir
kind of work which led the confusion at ten-
ding the 3 o expedition . the summer of 1898,
Such a body of men doing gene] staff duty is just
as necessary repare an .- . .i y for war in
time oJ ce as it is in time of war, It is not
an executive body, : ' linistrative bod;,
it acts only through y of others. It
makes intelligen effective execution of comn
possible by keeping all the separate agents advised
of the parts thej the general scheme
21 lb Id o
„ Po 18.,
22f:ittle, JoDc, Brigadier G S G :et)j The
i
,
t a 2ev _ -•
Co ] f9"b_ iupplie

Cn February 14, the year following hoot's appeal
,
Congress enacted legislation establisl. ing an i.rmy General
Staff o beet ion 2 of the law was .... • t a carbon copy of
the general staff functions described in Duties of the
Gener.il Staff, by General Paul Sronsart von Schellendorf
This is especially interesting since Schellendorf 9 recall^
was in the late nineteenth century the head of the opera-
tions section of the Prussian General Staff v who had strug
gled for the independence of the General Staff „ The e' -
der Moltke was the first Chief of Staff to really put the
theories of scharnhor s t , a? formalized by Clausewitz in
C_n_ ^ur, into practiceo It was Moltke " s deputy and succes=
sor , ..aldersee, who obtained freedom to speak to the iim=
perjr without consulting or even informing the War Mini-
ster
>y
and who arranged for the apoointment of Schellen-
dorf a? the Minister of 'A'ar It was this kind of mili-
tarism which had been so refined by the Prussians and used
as the model for nearly all estern armies, including the
American i.rmy, which caused alarm and distrust in a very
non-militaristic United States
It was not, however, the idea of the General Staff
as described by Secretary Root which was met with great
resistance o It is generally accepted that military or-
ganizations need some kind of planning staff The bene
of contention has been the idea of a Supreme Commander as
Chief of Staff ° Root passed over this very lightly, but
c>y e

when he said that plans should be "presented tc the Pre =
sident or general for his determination" (emphasis suppli--
he was touching on the real heart of the matter, which was
not to become the truly explosive matter until World rai
and after
o
It can be seen why Americans particularly abhor the
idea of a General Staff with a single chief , even when
they do not understand what a General Staff is They hav
the image of a General von beecht or Von Fritsch, com=
pint? with monocle and mustache, plotting world domination
vnd their worries are not unfounded when they consider the
history of the German Great General Staff
„
probably the
finest honed instrument of war which was ever fashionedo
It is to this kind of fear which G ingress has his =
torically addressed itself In the National Defense Act
of 191b it was stated that the General Staff Corps "shall
not be permit t°d to assume or engage in work of an ad =
ministrative nature that pertains to established bureaus
or offices of the War Department" ™ The language was to
become more explicit in the years to follow
Except for a very brief period after the establish-
ment of the Navy General -.card in 1909 under Secretary
of the Navy Truman Newberry, the i^avy has not had a Gen
eral Staff o In fact it was the creation of the General
Board, close on the heels of the -jr-my General Staff whi
led to an investigation by direction of President Theodc
25Beishline, Ope Gito, p. 23
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Roosevelt*, The investigation resulted in a statement of
the dual role of the Secretary^ the civil responsibility
of procuring the resources necessary for the operating
forces s and the military responsibility of employing those
forces o ith this* the Navy bilinear consumer -producer
system was created and has remained the basis of naval or-
ganizati on ever since It was further developed and streng-
thened by the recommendations of the 1962 Dillon Board
review of Navy management
The Navy did not, however, change the Army philo-
sophy* and when the Department of the \ir Force was created
in 1947, it was established with a General Staff and Chief
of Staff • Thus we have a Chief of "aval Operations for
the vavy, rather than a Chief of Staff, Navy, is more
than an obstinate desire on the part of the Navy to have
a different title for its chiefo
The purpose of the ircadia Conference in Washing-
ton D.C., following the imerican entry into World .;ar II,
and attended by hoosevelt, Churchill, the military-
leaders of the Uobo and the British Chiefs of Staff Com-
mittee (CSC), was to make provisions for the combined pro-
secution of the war. The Combined Chiefs of Staff was
established (which tacitly established the American Joint
Chiefs of Staff) with co-equal status of all members, even
the Commanding General of the ",rmy <Air Force., This was




In 1943 the American Chiefs proposed "a bupreme
Commander be designated at once to command all United
Nations operations against Germany from the Mediterranean
and the Atlantic c The British Chiefs strongly opposed
th a plan, a c did Churchill , who wrote in a note to Roose-
velt:
5o If the two commands are merged under a Su-
preme Commander
s
the British would have available
against Germany In May (19'" 4) decidedly larger fore:
than the United States It would therefore app p r,r
that the Supreme command should go to a British
officer T should be very reluctant? as he .d of
His Majesty/ 's Government, to place such an invi-
dious responsibility upon a British officer „ If,
on the other hand, disregarding the preponderance
of forces involved, the Supreme Command were given
to a United States officer and he oronounced in fa-
vour of concentrating on "Overlord" irrespective
of the injur v done to cur affairs In the Mediter-
ranean, His Majesty's Government could not possibly
agree The Supreme Commander, British or American^,
would therefcre be placed in an impossible position
6c It is not seen why the present arrangement
should not continue, subject to any minor improve-
ments that can be suggested,, „ <> ^
The American proposal was delivered on November 25
according to Churchillo It is peculiar that a proposal
of such significance would not be remembered by Admiral
King who was at the Si-XT ; Conference in Cairo when "the
proposal for one over=all Supreme Command was presented
to us by the American Chiefs of Staff in a formal memo-
94 Churchill, Winston S , The Second, if; or Id £ar>




random. From this it was apparent that the ^resident and
"unerican High Command felt strongly that a bupreme Comman°
der should be appointed to command all the United Nations
operations against Germany » ' ill that King recollected
of that day was th^ Thanksgiving service which the Bri-
tish residents of Cairo had so thoughtfully arranged for
the Yanks, ' Nothing was mentioned In his memoirs about
the bupreme Commander proposal o However , there can be
no doubt about what King thought of the Joint chiefs of
Staff system after the vVar
The present system which provides for joint
action of three autonomous services should oe r
tainedo o <> <>
That the organization of the Joint chiefs of
btaff was effective in wartime is self evident in
view of the victory that was won„ 30 in less time than
even the most optimistic would have believedo o the
strength of th.p Joint Chiefs of Staff lies in the
combined knowledge possessed oy the members and in
the "checks and balances" that tend to prevent do-
mination by any one person„ hen the history of the
Joint Chiefs of btaff comes to be written, their
record will show how many proposals = including some
of my own • had to yield to cogent reasoning of one
or mure members c^
In his Or and Alliance
,,
Oiurchill blessed the Com=
bined Chiefs of btaff concept, which was an international
extension of the Joint btaff system,, Churchill fi s comment
was made after the ar during which the Combined Chiefs
26 Ibid
o , pp. 335-336
o
on
King, Ernest J c and -'alter Muir Whitehall, Fleet
Admiral Kin_£* Naval Kecord y Lyre and bpottiswoode, Lon=
don, 1953, p* 303
„
28Ibid c 9 ppo 436-437o
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had held some 200 meetings:
However sharp the conflict of views at the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff meetings, however frank and
even heated the argument., sincere loyalty to the
common Cause prevailed ever national or personal in-
terests o Decisions reached and approved by the heads
of Governments were pursued by all with a perfect
loyalty, especially by those whose original ooiniens
had been overruled,, There was never a failure to
reach effective agreement for action, or to send
clear instructions to the commanders in every the
trecooThere never was a more serv iceable war machine
established among allies 000 2^
In the U*S», it is not surprising th.it the major pre-
from LI:
ponents of the General Staff system have come mostly /irmy
and \ir rorce where the system has been successfully em-
ployed • It is also not surprising that the General staff
system is generally challenged by naval leaders who have
operated successfully without a General Staff, furthermore,
naval officers of flag rank have be^n s by that time in
their careers, exoosed to land warfare , through operations
with the Marines, and air warfare through naval air oper
tions, in addition to sea warfare per se
\mphibious operations, an age old specialty cf the
i\aVj
,
the Navy especially aware of and interested in
unified operations long before the firmed Forces were or-
ganized on a unified basis Today 9 the most truly uni-
fied command (from the point of view of having large \rmy,
Wavy and >ir force jommitted to it), the Pacific Commai
is a 'Navy Sponsored' command, i»e„ , ' ? 'is a naval of-
29 Nicholas, Jack D oy Colonel, Qb oionel George
Pickett, USA; Captain William 0, Spears* Jr., QSNj The
Joint and Combined Staff Cf f icer ' s_ ivianual, The Stakpole
Co.
„
Harris burg, p. ',1955", p.lln Emphasis supplied.
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ficer whose command systpm is maintained by Commander in
Chief Pacific Fleet (a Navy component commander) and CNO«
The Department of the Navy is the executive agency for
support of the Pacific Commando So, whether with valid
reasoning or not, it may be speculated that many senior
naval officers feel that they are more sympathetic to
Vrray and f^ir Porce functions and objectives, than are Army
and \ir Porce officers sympathetic to or understanding of
sea power o If this speculation has any Oasis in fact, it
is not difficult to understand why naval officers would be
very hesitant to have an Army or <\ir Porce officer in over-
all strategic command of the Armed Porce? . Probably even
more important in the naval officer's leanings is a rea-
son similar to that of the rmy and \ir Porce officers'
i„eo, the Navy ha c traditionally been established ale-
bilinear lines of military md civilian control, and In
this repoect the Joint Staff system more closely resem-
bles the Navy system than it does the irmy or \ir Porce
Osten ; , : , this would not appear to be the case when cut
sees the similarity between G-l, :\-l, and J«l; (J- 2, A-2,
and J=>2; etc; out this similarity is irrelevant.. The
heart of naval organization is, as stated elsewhere... the
establishment of naval force requirements by CNC and the
fulfillment of those requirements by the bureaus >nd
i though the bureaus are military organizations, they
are responsible to -xnd under the executive direction of
75o

the secretary of the Navy* This Is remarkably similar to
the split function of the JCS and Secretary of Defsnse
The JUS determine the supocrt requirements of the unified
and specified commands and recommend the establishment
force structure of those commands to SLODiLj . The Defense
Supply Agency j responsible to the Secretary., in part Fu]
fills those requir *s 5 In many other ways the beer
tary influences the fulfillment of those requirement;
particularly through the Program change Control Syste
In the financial area the Navy has also long been accus-
tomed to the Idea of the Navy Comptroller being a civil
executive as is the Defense . omptroller 9 as is not , for
example, the ;ir Force Comptroller
It is no less surprising th-it Churchill and the
tish Chiefs of Staff Committee favor the Joint Staff system,
They invented it c Miny will disagree,, citing th establj
nt of the mericui Joint hoard in 190? as opposed tc
British origins in 1904 of the Committee en Imperial De-
fense and later Central Organization for Defense ever-
theless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff system as we know It
today had its origin in the British Chiefs of bta r f Com-
mittee which was established in 1924„ But the matter of
insemination is largely academic. The point Is that the
system h d served the British long and well. ind, a c the
UoSo Congress had gone through the General Staff debate
in 1947 9 so had the British in 1946°
76.

second alternative was the creation of a com-
bined General Staff - that is, a General Staff on
the German conception, drawn from the three services*
This body would formulate defense policy, issue di-
rect i T? '.'
,
freed, it was claimed, from the service
bias nd tendency toward compromise which was orient
in the existing Joint Staff systenio Having regard
particularly for weaknesses revealed by a study of
the German wartime General Staff, the government de-
cided that It was unsafe in practice and sound in
principle to divorce responsibility for planning
from responsibility for the execution of those plans
This hid oroved to be one of the cardinal defects of
the German system.
The British decided therefore to continue with
their Jhiefs of Staff Committee served by Joint Staff s„
Thus the men who formulate the plans are those who
have the responsibility carrying them cut in the
Service Departments e This principle had been adop-
ted in the international sphere during 7orld :ar TT
with the creation of the combined Chiefs of Staff or-
ganization, and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff
have operated on the same basiso To remedy such de-
fects in pre-war organization as a lack of a central
ministry, a Minister of Defense and a Defense Mini-
stry were created . This cave the necessary too level
ithority and direction in the organization for form-
ulating and applying unified defense policy
,
The single Ministry of Supoly adopted on July
1959.. .of the many proposals considered in the
Lhited States for x similar system, few if j.ny have
ference to the British counterpart o
\s of 1956, th<^ Ministry of Supoly is responsi-
for ill procurement of the 'rmy and \ir Force
and certain weapons, such as guided missiles, used
by the Navy. 30
c igb of course there are many differences, the
striking resemblence between the British red \merican
systems raises x point the author did not find anywhere
discussed in his research = that is the inate value of
having closely corresponding systems of defense in the U.S„
and "treat Britain. /hile the point seems elementary, and
while it must have been a major underlying consideration
Stanley; C_o Cit_, pp. 146-149
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during and prior to the /\rcadia Conference and the resul-
tant establishment cf the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it is
a point which is apparently assumed and not considered wor-
thy of mention in the many books on the subject ^nc1 in de-
tailed Congressional hearings concerning the advantages and
disadvantages of the General and Joint Staff systems,, Yet,
is it a point which we can afford to regard implicity? Gen=
ei l1 I hi-j :''c > .' ling, US'lF, (then Chairman of the Joint
ohiefs cf Staff), in his oreward to The Joint and Combined
Staff Officers r.-ianual said:
The statement by President Eisenhower that se-
parate ground, sea, -aid air warfare is gone forever
is one of the principle manifestations cf the re-
volution taking place in the area of warfare 0oo *
Today we have gone a step futher in that revolution
'Vhile we still have cur Lebanons md Cubas and other pre-
dominantly American operations, the day of any separate,
large-scale, American involvement is ~one forever o This
too is a manifestation - not only of the revolution in
the art of warfare but of the evolution of the whole oo-
litico-military environment,, e have seen the Joint Sta
-.
;
it n r rk in a world war on an international stif p basis.
There is no evidence that the Joint Staff system is not
functioning LI in the cold war. If this is true, j.nd if
the Joint Staff syst • is effective for small operations
,
it would m to be a sirrnificanl r< ason to favor re1 •
;
51r





the Joint Staff system as the basis for American military
behavior , The argument is further strengthened by con-
sideration of still more complex IATC or other collective
security organization combined operations . It 5° no more
likely no. that the British or other allies will loo!
voral ly upon an American Supreme c q er in any future
nt than it whs en Thanksgiving in Cairo, Tndeed^
it seems naive to consider that the U,S would permit an
officer of any other nation to act as Supreme Commander of
all allied forces including our own, without ,S. vetc or
ether highly constraining power
s
ith such dc : rs we
would ro7 the very element which is most commonly held
up as the ultimate reason for the G 1 Staff - unity
of com 3 The thought that we mighl a nation employ
a - i i Staff system .^nd simultaneously subscribe to an
International Joint Staff system is inconsiste n-t by de-
fir itier and would surely prove to oe so by operation.
Cne other point which seems conspicuous by its ab-
sence " th d f nse literature: the assumption that be-
th< General Staff s. srks for a single mili-
tary service it should work for the services jointly;
that the General Staff system is another way of doing
business which has universal application., General Max-
well Taylor in the 1958 Congressional hearings on Defense
Reorganization stated
:
oeing a chief of i
;
neral staff, I find it
difficult to understand really the aversion to the
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term "General Staff". 3usiness h teral st
"
r
e have general-type staffs In the vrmy all the -
down to the division* It is just an efficient m?
convent: cnal way tc group helpers to senior g raL
So I would hope bv_explanat ion that the princiole
ould be accepted „
Sine ral Taylor raised the point cf the General
Staff tern In business, it might be worthwhile te look
into modern business thinking in this regard. Tt can
readil; be seen wherein the General Staff system could be
very effectively employed in a large business enterprise.
i u + the differences be + ~ r the stuff functions of, say,
I 3 and procurement Gun hardly be compared to the
differences between naval and land operations. \ corpor=
atior chairman of the board may have come up through the
procurement rout <nd while lack cf marketing experience
need not get him into serious trouble, it also might get
him into very serious trouble. Hayal a explores thi e
problem in industry in his article, " ,'hy the Edsel Laid
an Egg: Motivational Research vs„ the Reality Principle. "33
Dearborn and olmcn give mor~ clinical evidence of the
problem in industry which raises, very seriously, questions
about the use of the General btaff system even in busi-
ness. Their findings were not startling, but are never-
theless commonly overlooked. Several Interrrediate mana=
32Biadaz, Frances ji. , CDh, USNj Defense He organ! z
tion During the Eisenhower Admini s tration, unpublished
doctoral dissertation, Georgetown University, 1960, p.428 D
3
*Ha3 a, S.I ; "Why the Edsel laid an Egg," from




gers frcm the sales, production, accounting, personnel,
medical and legal departments of a corporat icn were given
^ A.
the famous Harvard case study of the "Castengo Steel Co« !K'
to study. The case is widely used in graduate management
seminars in organization theory and pclicyo Cnly the names
have been fictionalized in the study u The managers selec-
ted for the De .rborn and bimon study were people who were
regarded as potential top management material <ch sa
in the case only his own special interest problems and over-
looked the others* This is the phenomenon which is known
to psychologists as selective perception. Yet the real
problems with Castengo were organization-wide in natures,
embracing personnel, marketing, sales, R&D, costing, man-
agement and operations. They had very bread organizational
policy implications.
Dearborn and bimon concluded:
,e have pr • ted data en th» selective percep-
tions of industrial executives exposed tc case ma-
terial that support, the hypothesis that each execu-
tive will perceive those aspects cf a situation that
relate specifically to the activities ^nd goals of
his department ,
.
» /"Hi though they7were motivated to
lock at the problem from a company-wide rather than
departmental view point „ „ a o^'^
Smith, George Albert and C Roland Christensen,
Policy 'emulation and "ministration, Casebook of Top-
^anagerent °r
o
b i ems in Business , Fourth Edition, Richard
D„ Irwin, Inc. , Home wood 111, 1962, ppol68-l90o
55Dearbcrn, Dewitt C» and Herbert A« bimon, "Selec-
tive Perception: \ Note on the Departmental Identifications
of executives "„ Socicmetry, Vol» 21, No 2, June 1958,
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^n short: you sees what ycu knows best, and not m
awful lot more. selective perception is a characteristic
of human behavior, more apparent in some than other
s
It
cannot, however, be legislated away.
That this fact is recognized in the modern business
world is evidence in a study by the imeric in Management
Association on To^ Management Committees o^*3 a survey of
93 participating firms revealed 76 which had general
management committees, 15 which had restricted committees
(personnel, operations, K&D, etc.) and 66 which had botho
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Inc was cited as one
of the most prominent and experienced of corn paries in com-
mittee management, which, between th<= two concepts of
General and Joint Staff systems, much more closely resem=
bles the latter.
The study listed 'as Du Pont's reasons for embracing
tn system "(1) the strength and security of group deci-
sions; (2) objectivity in decision making; (3) ccntir. -
uity of administration; (4) development of per sonneL, mJ
The faults charged ..gainst the system most generally were
reported as "cost of operation, irresponsibility, compro-
mise and expediency, slowness, by-passing of established
authority, and shifting of responsibility „
"
38
^ 6Lohmann, M.R.; Top Management C omm i t t e " s , Th £
functions and \uthor ity ; AMA Research otudy 48, American
: .nagement \ssoc, Few York, 1961.
57 Tb id .
,
p . 10 ?8 Ioid
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The company ^residents who participated in the study
( it is interesting to note that the opinions and facts
were g thered from persons who had a great deal to gain
or lose by corporation success or failure) rated the func-
tions of their general management committers in the fol-
lowing order: "(l) to formulate policy; (2) to recommend
action to t h^ president; (3) to formulate action in speci-
fic cases; (4) to coordinate action in areas of respcnsi-
bility ^ ,ocut half of the general management committees
consisted of seven or fewer members and were not subject
to veto by the chairman. In the restricted committers
the functions were: "(1) to analyze information and data;
(2) to formulate action in specific cises; an? (?) to re-
commend action to the president., ° The difference in
scope between the general management and restricted corn-
mittees seems about proportional to that of the JCS and
various joint, battle teams*
two
Only /cor porat i en presidents regarded the system as
inef'ective c oeven said that committee functions will be
increasedo Suggestions were advanced for the improve-
ment of the system, the most important of which were: (l)
the sending of agenda to members before the meeting; (2)
regularly scheduled meetings; (3) a satisfactory means of
arriving at decisions; and (4) reporting and filing min-
n 41
utes of committee acticru
39 Ioid 40 Ibid 6 ,p a ll„ 41 Ibid
8;

It is especially noteworthy of comment that the Joint
Chiefs of Staff employ all four of these suggestions to-
day, and have for years, though to what extent the third
is developed or formalized for the JGS meetings themselves,
the author does not know. Prior to JCb meetings, the pro-
cedures arp fairly standard. In the case of the chief of
Kaval Operations, he is briefed in the CNC Conference
Room the day before JCb meetings The papers to come up
for consideration are briefed individually by an CPNA1
staff officer,, The paper is then discussed among CNO, the
act! or officer, the DCN'O and A.CNO for P '.ana and Policy and
various division directors and other interested staff of-
ficers. C^TC then determines for himself whether he will
vote the paper into the "red stripe" as is - approved JCb
papers are red strio^d - or whether he will propose alter-
natives or a dissenting positicn Usually,, however, by
the time of this conference, the service staffs have al-
ready ironed out differences in content and language.
The point here is not tc draw a comparison between
military and industrial operations, though they existo The
notion that there is nothing else in the world like mili-
tary operations Is a commonly held shibboleth in the ser-
vices which has often caused us to fail to profit from
the experiences of others outside of the services But
the point here is to challenge the statement that busi-
nesses employ the General Staff system, on the grounds
84

that modern corporations ar^ having a very close look at
this whole area. nd although, like anything else, there
have been a numoer cf attacks on so-called "management,
by committee" (which would surely be viewed with disbe-
lief in the dritish Chiefs of Staff Committee if not in
the JCS), there ar s also a. number cf very respectable firms
employing group management techniques with seeming success
„
Nor is this an attempt to compare management committees
to the Joint Staff system, though likenesses are certairly
there o jor differences are there too, over and above
the obvious cnes of objectives, stakes, etc ^or example,
93% of the firms in the \M \ study do not rotate their
committee chairmanships 42 ^3 while 96% of the firms de-
cided by committee vote, the implication was that the
vote need not be unanimous, as is the heart of the Joint
S/stem That is, non-unanimcus decisions go forward a?
such with dissenting ooinions and alternative courses
action for final determination by the Secretary of Defense
or Presidento In business, in some instances, the com-
mittee decision is final. In others the chairman has veto
power
.
what is pertinent, however, i c th° implication that
large, highly competitive, cost -conscious firms have raised
doubts over the ability cf any one man today to grasp the
entire scope of the environment which affects his organiza-
tion directly at the top level, not to mention the indirect
42 Tbid o , p. 58o
85

influences throughout. No question has been raised at the
operational level, where the world is smaller, though the
restricted committees have worked favorably at the inter-
mediate levels. But the real question has been raised at
the too, where life has be<=n infinitely more complicated
.7 advances in transportation, communication, automation,
and technology in general „ This raises the point that what
may be good at the bottom or even the middle cf an organi-
zational chart may be obsolete at the top.
It also poses the interesting question of generalist
vs. subspecialist vs. specialist background as the most
suitable for top management or commando
The notion that the success of the General Staff in
the ^rmy -.nd .ir Force is evidence cf the system's use-
fulness in joint matters is especially without merit or
proof o The association between strategic bombing and in-
fantry operations is exceedingly remote to say the least v
when compared, say, to the relation between infantry and
artillery operations,, Yet the General Staff would hav -
at one time or another - not simultaneously = strategic
bombing experts and infantry experts as Supreme Commanders,
deciding issues of vital importance to the other, Not
only may the individual fail to decide in favor cf the
other, or even to the benefit of everyone, but he may
very well fail to understand the vitalness of particular
decisions outside of his own sphere cf experience^ This
8bo

cculd result in severe outcomes
There is a good deal of talk about 'unity of com-
mand ' in these discussions, Nicholas, Pickett and Spears
state that this and service viewpoint (seemingly mutually
exclusive considerations) are the two major unresolved war-
time problems of the JCb system,, - ivhere is the documen-
tary evidence to supoort this viewpoint rel tive to + he
wartime conduct of the JCS and Combined Chiefs 9 The prin =
cipals in the drama did not reveal any serious breakdown
during the war. ind there is, as has been cited else-
where, some rather authoritative evidence tc the contrary,
from the persons of King and Churchill, for example „ These
are people who ought to know' Nor have there been any strong
arguments in support of the thesis that unity of command
Cur only be. compatible with singularity of perscn. There
is no evidence that a group of individuals working as a
corporate body, as does the, JCo, cannot work under the
principle of unity of commando hat is needed is a common
understanding of the JCb as the corporate body it. is
The term 'Joint chiefs of Staff 8 must be regarded as a
singular proper noun, net as a plural one v if the concept
under which it operates is to ce understood
o
The principle cf 'unity-of -command ! was formally
introduced by the French management theorist of the prin-
ciples school, Henri Fayol, in his General and Industrial
45Ficholas, et al, Cp_ Cit D , pp ll-15o
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*g_nagernent (first published in French in 1916, in English
in 1949 ) c Cther principles c fr< i the same movement -
the scalar principle, better known in the military as t]
chain of command; and the principle of span of control.
The latter is also pertinent to this discussion (
i'or years we have considered span of control as the
principle that there* is a limit to the number of people
one person can effectively supervisee borne theorists,
such as Oraicunasf 4 say outright that five or eight is the
;ic number «,
T suggest that there is a new principle now, which
might, be termed the 'span of information' or 'span of en-
ment' principle,, \nd that is this: for high com
or top management officials, there i limit to the amc
of information and the scope of environment that any one
person can absorb - even that information or environment
which directly influences his position or role - and th
it Varies with the individual This is especially true
in the defense organization at a time when so-called
'non-military actions' have taken on such far~reachin
military implications, and where the cost of error is
grim to contemplate
o
In the end, of course, someone must have the final
power of decision, the final responsibility , unless all
decisions are to be voted en. For us it can be no one b
Haynes, .' . arren md Joseph L* Massie; viana^ement
ilusis s Concept and i , Prentice=Hall, Inc. Engle=
wood Cliffs, tj.j,, 1961, pp o 40~41 o
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the Presidents fcr it is he who is finally responsible,
oy law and traditicnc It is in him that final unity of
command is attained,, It is he if anyone who must act as
the Supreme Commander „ It is his Secretary of Defense who
acts as his Deputy c It is the JCS who are his principal
military advisors „ This is a far cry from the German Great
General Staff or any other General Staff „ Military offi-
cers understand the principle of authority being commen-
surate with responsibility „ The same persons should be
first to understand the responsibility which is th° Pre-
sident's, and the subsequent need fcr close control of
the authority which goes with that responsibil ity „ The
President is also human and more subject to the tremen-
dous span of environment cind information than anyone else.
He must depend upon the integrity of his civilian and
military assistants and advisors to solve as many of the
problems and make as many of the decisions as possible,
taking to him only those problems which they ccnnot solve
,
or which he desires to pass on perscnally c 'hen they do
come to hi" 1 h c must be told the al t er natives and their
perc eived consequences „ There is less time for triviality
in th r' hite House each yeir, Cnly the hard problems must
find their way there* Some hard ones will be solved at
the JCS or SECDtB levels, but they will enjoy also the
luxury of an occasional easy cne That luxury is be-
coming more and more remote tc the °resident s
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But the ^resident cannot r°ly solely on the inte-
grity of the men working for him c There is too much
strike. He must incor porate control systems - chec'
and balances - so that no Secretary, no Chief of Staff,
can, through sickness of mind or soul, or dimness of wit,
place the nation on the brink of disaster o Gr ever.
It is an especially difficult thing fcr a military
officer to think in termsof committee, or group, or cor-
porate-body decision-making, particularly at the pinnacle
of his career ne has been trained for personal command
and responsibility all of his mature life It is the es-
sence of the military profession,. But there is in fact
no proof whatever that the principle of single command
(as oppose:? tc corporate body command) is pertinent at the
very top of cur military organization by virtue of the
fact that it is pertinent everywhere else,, <nd while the
General btaff may work perfectly at the division level >
or the \rmy level, or even the headquarters level, it does
not follovj automatically that it will suffice at the
joint level,, The differences between command and control
are not all insignificant; and the quantum leap in the
a of information and environment, and the broadening
of the value set base, do not represent the least of these
Commander Biadasz, in her brilliant dissertaticr




The difference between in Overall \rmed forces
General Staff system and a Joint Chiefs of Staff
system lies essentially in the ecisicn making pro-
cess. It dees not matter whether the pick and sho-
vel substructure is divided into components which
are assigned numbers or colors, or whether these com-
ponents each deal with special functional aspects
of j. military problem such as personnel, logistic
,
intelligence etc. or whether they are organized in
teams to treat a problem as a •. 'holeo . <> The essential
difference does not lie there
The difference lies in: (l) the way the organ-
ization serves the civilian decision making process;
(2) who stands at Its apex
If the chief of state always receives out one
single recommendation on each military matter to
which hi? decision making power may apply only a "yes"
cr a "no", his military advisors ar^- the Suoreme Chief
of Staff and Tver all rmed Forces General Staff If,
at times, h^ receives not one single recommendation
but two or more, if he Is offered alternatives with
arguments supporting each, and he must choc tween
or among them, his military advisers operate under the
Joint Chiefs of Staff system
• OQOOO0QO0 0OO»OOO« • O Oo OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOi>OOQ OOOOOOOOOOOOOO
In other words, the difference lies in: (l)
ther the organization which recommends military
policy and strategy to the civilian superiors speaks
with one voice, cr whether, on occasion, It can speak
with several; (2) whether at the top of this advisory
body there is one supreme military officer or whether
there are several, all, or all but one, of whom is the
responsible head of his own military service.
The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff system
has at its apex four co-equal officers and. sometimes
five,, o . /"Tncluding7 the Chairman who may come from
any one of the armed services but who may not exer-
cise command over the Joint Chiefs or ever any of the
a Joint Chiefs organization.:
*/ CL *J J. UO IJ AH- » UO.U^O£
alter Millis, in his preface to the Battershaw transla
tion of Walter Goerlitz's History cf the German General
Staff 1657-1945 , said this about the German General Staff:
To two generations of Americans the German General
45Biadasz: Co. Cite, oo. 351-353
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Staff has stood as an object of hatred, fear and rn-
vulsion. In tb" twc greatest of cur wars Germany
was cur principal opponent; twice in a lifetime we
have seen our normal world, if not cur national ex-
istence itself, imperilled by her formidable and
ruthless armies, Through the whole thirty years from
1914 to 1945 we were to live mor<= or less und°r the
shadow of the grimly expert
,
professional militarism
hich these armies wer^ led - a tradition nur-
tured and in th e world's eyes personified, oy the
German Great General Staff
o
O ^*e & Q • •OO000OO«»a00O^06000O0000OO00O0O906O00O0Q0 3 : j
The Great General Staff is dead, md no one
can say that its answers to the central problems cf
military organ:" Zit icns and. command in a democratic-
capitalistic society were the sound cnes c at- we
can certainly profit by its examplSo^
1 e have seen both systems en a national scale in
modern times „ The Joint system was also tested on an in-
ternational scale o One system contributed to the loss of
two or Id "'ars and styled its own annihilation Through
the other those wars were won. That is not to say that
we mightn't have won the wars even if we had had a General
Staff cf our own. But it is to say that the nation which
had so finely honed the General Staff as an instrument cf
war - the nation which developed its potential beyond all
others - did net win. Twice, when it counted, the system
failed \nd when it comes to war, winning is (or has been)
considered the universal measurement of success
Cur Joint Chiefs of Staff, or Joint Staff, system
46 Goer 1 it z, .alter; History cf the German General
6taf f lu57-194b , trans, by brian oattershaw; intr-Oo by
altar Millis, Frederick -io Prager, 1959, pp v-x c
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is imperfect. So for that matter is cur «vay of govern-
ment. And so my friends are we all, especially as indi=
vidualSo nd this acknowledgement is the very corners tc
of any perception of the Joint Staff concepto because it




BLUEPRINTS FOR DLFtiNS fr: SOMF DjcSISN CRITERIA
The degree of effectiveness of U.s defense may be
regarded as a measure of effectiveness of the National
Command Participants, i.e., the President and Commander
in Chief of the Armed Forces, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of defense, the Director of Central Intelligence
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as ether govern-
ment officials and advi£ers as th c President may deem
desirable (such as, today, IvlcGeorge Bundy and Robert
Kennedy), This at leapt is true in the long run and dur-
ing periods of crisis, for the National Command °artici-
pants, whether known as the National security Council,
the Jixecutive Committee (or KXCCil), or by any other name,
meet only periodically md during periods of crisis,
There is, however, another body which I call the \merican
tional High Command - the President, SECDKF and JCS -
which formulates and oversees nati onal defense policy ind
strategy on a day-to-day basis, though net necessarily
together. It is this body which has been the subject of
the present study.
The author must confess that he set cut on this
study with predispositions that the National High Com-
mand should include, as the military high command, a
General Staff with a military supreme Commander of the
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Armed Forces. I have proved to myself that I was wrong.
The United States has in the Joint Staff system a sound
organization for the formulation of defense policy and
strategy. It is a system geared for, and tested in, large
scale
nd small/ warfare. Tt retains the valuable input of the
individual military services while maintaining civilian
control. It forces involvement of the civilian leaders
who are designated by law as responsible for national de-
fense. Tt recognizes both the failings md limitations
cf human beings as well as their strengths. Tt recog-
nizes the inseparability cf the planning Lnd execution of
national strategy. It recognizes the complexity cf cur
modern environment and the principle of the span of in-
formation. It acknowledges the need for a system which
will be effective for combined as well as U.b. military
operations. oreover, it works.
The Joint Staff system should be retained. It can
be improved through closer contact among the service chiefs
and SLCDj . This means that the number-two officers cf
the military departments must play greater parts in the
management of their respective departments, freeing the
chiefs of the departments for a more active role in the
JCo. A the same time the JCS must not become isolated
from their own departments, since this is a cornerstone
of the JCb structure.
The JCS must brief together, daily, with SecDEF in
the National Military Command Center.

e must improve our alert provisions. We re-
quire our ooerational forces to De on alert times mea-
sured in minutss. Yet it has frequently taken our high
command staffs several hours to respond to Presidential
queries. nvery means of human, technological, and organ-
izational improvement must be bent toward improving hi^h
command - ooth civilian and military - and staff reaction
time, so that the quick reaction time of our forces can
be meaningful.
'ihere are many improvements which can be made to
the present system and in the interest of oetter civilian-
military relationships. A few have been suggestd here.
3ut we should not be deceived into thinking, because the
system needs improvement, that it is fundamentally no good,
or that what problems we have today would go away or be
lessened with a General Staff system.
I have only introduced one level of the problem -
the National High Command. e need badly to study ad-
jacent levels. In particular, we need to study the im-
plications of the National Command Participant structure.
With some Presidents it has been the Cabinet. With others
it has been the National Security Council. Now we have
such a body which is less formally structured. e need
to study this in terms of continuity of defense from one
President to the next, in terms of the dangers inherent
in minimizing the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in
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terms of what effects it may have on the role of the Cabinet
and the National Security Council in defense or associated
matters.
e need to study the organization of the military
departments, particularly the Navy Department. It may well
be that we have already passed the state of teclno-polit ico-
military existence in which our present organizations are
relevant. It may well be, for example, that the time has
arrived at which we should extend the Joint Staff system
to the military departments. Consider the possibility of
the Joint Staff system in the Navy. The C T, 'C would be
roughly to the Navy what the Chairman of the JCS is to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. He would retain his status as Navy
Member of the Jcb and orincipal Naval adviser to the Pre-
sident, SECDEF, and KSC. The membership of the 'Navy Chiefs
of Staff 1 would consist of a naval surface officer, a naval
aviator, a submariner and a Marine. The body, or Naval
High Command, would, on a co-equal basis, formulate naval
force structure requirements, strategy and policy. Dif-
ferences which could not be reconciled by the Navy Chiefs
would be presented to the Secretary of the Navy for deter-
mination. Such an organization might not only ensure a
proper balance of naval forces in th n years to come, but
would clarify and strengthen the role of SECNAV without
destroying naval leadership from the officer corps.
No one can say that such a plan could work, or that,
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even if it could, it would be an improvement of the pre-
sent system. But we cannot overlook the possibilities of
improving our' lot. e cannot rest on tradition alone.
The Joint Staff system is sound for many other rea-
sons than that it is traditional in cur government. That
is a point we must never forget, at least until such time
as it is shown to be no longer true.
as we study these levels - those of the Military De-
partments, the National High Command, and the National
Command participants - we must, 'o-^ prepared for th^ pain-
ful as well as the happy findings. Military and civili-
ans alike may find that their roles differ radically from
their preconceived notions and traditions. Both may have
to bend to form the best national defense mold.
Whatever we find - whatever we decide - one thing
seems to stand cut as a guiding principle: e can never
gain be deceived by the notion of different peacetime and
artime high command organizations. In seme irony we
ight recall the words of General Carl von Clausewitz:
"If a cautious commander tries... to twist, him-
self skillfully into a peace through the characteri-
stic weakness of his enemy in the field and in the
Cabinet, we have no right to find fault with him...
still we must require him to remember that he only
travels on forbidden tracks, here the God of >,ar
may surprise him; that he ought always to keep his
eye on the enemy, in order that he may not have to
defend himself with a dress ropier if the enemy takes
up a sharp sword." 47
The words might well have been spoken by the oracle
47
Von Clausewitz, General Carl; On War, Trans, by
Colonel J.J. Graham; Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., LTD.,
London; n.P. "Out ton and Co., N.Y., 1918., Vol. I, p. 45.
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at the temple of Mars Grad'ivus.
And we had better listen closely, for these truly are
our alternatives. ,111 one of us wear the sword always 9
Or will we attempt to trade in our rapier each time we are
faced with crisis 9 To carry the sword need not mean to
rattle it; and, at least for the foreseeable future, I
submit that it is the sword and not the rapier which must
be at our side. If I were to choose that sword, I would
select it from fine, light, British ste^l, not the heavy
Prussian variety. ind I would have it honed oy the best






If we cculd journey tc the t°mple of ilars o.uiri'rus,
perhaps we cculd save ourselves a great deal of ..ear and
tear, or worse. ha f would oe th c oracle's r^p^e'' This
is what I hear: Do whatever ycu must f c make th Q most of
y o ur r i cnes ; the o,r " great out not u^li^ite-l ; et th^ rest
fro- what ycu have ; KELP . STRONG 5CDY ; and visit IraJ 'lvr ,
and, travelling to the temple of Mars Grad'i^us, I hear
this: Push Pack the s
n
ar e s of your offices g shrink the res -
ponse time of your s t af f s to that which ycu expect of your






Lacking this kind of divine guidance, we must kne ..
'..'-11 and listen closely tc nrhat has gone before us. e
must not, however, build a future out of history _lon 3 .
e must oe quick to think of the unlikely and test the
different. 'hile never forgetting what we hav« already




If we cculd journey to the t°mple of Mars Quiri'nus,
perhaps we could save ourselves a great deal of wear and
tear, or worse. :; hat would be the oracle's message 9 This
Is what I hear : p_o whatever you must to make the most of
your r iches ; they ar ? great Put not unlimited ; get the most
from what you have ; KELP A STRONG BODY ; and visit Grad 'ivus .
.ind, travelling to the temple of Mars Grad'ivus, I hear
this: Push back the snares of your offices; shrink the res -
ponse time of your staffs to that which you expect of your
armies ; use wisdom in your war councils ev en in peace ;
KE P A. S"TJ?T H \VT) .
Lacking this kind of divine guidance, we must know
well and listen closely to what has gone before us. We
must not, however, build a future out of history alone.
e must be quick to think of the unlikely and test the
different. 'Jhlle never forgetting what we have already
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